Some long-running litigation is the gift that keeps on giving. Some is Dawson-Damer v Taylor Wessing LLP [2020] EWCA Civ 352, back to the Court of Appeal for the second time and very much a case of diminishing returns. Unless you are a trusts lawyer, particularly in the Bahamas, or fascinated by filing systems. And who isn’t one of those things? Continue reading →

Relatively unnoticed in the morass of GDPR and Data Protection Act 2018 provisions is the right under section 166 DPA 2018 to apply to the First-tier Tribunal for an order that the ICO progress a complaint which has been made to it under section 165 or Article 77 GDPR. In other words, the core aim of the provision is to deal with situations in which the ICO has taken too long to address a complaint made about, for example, compliance with a subject access request. But what is the nature of the FTT’s role? Continue reading →

We all sort of know that the Data Protection Act 1998 didn’t apply to stuff people say orally, don’t we? But pointing to an authority that said so is rather harder. Luckily, now we have one: Scott v LGBT Foundation Ltd [2020] EWHC 483 (QB). Continue reading →

In the spirit of the Panopticon, it is good to know that the CJEU is always watching. Or at least, it is broadly content with those who are in its recent decision of Case C-708/18 TK v Asociatia de Proprietari bloc M5A-ScaraA (EU:C:2019:1064) – snappy eh? Continue reading →

Just in time for Christmas, Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe has handed down his Opinion in Case C-311/18 Data Protection Commissioner v Facebook Ireland Ltd & Schrems (EU:C:2019:1145). As was noted in our post following the oral hearing (here), the reference concerns the compatibility of the European Commission’s standard contract clauses decision (or at least one of them) with Charter rights, Directive 95/46/EC, the GDPR and the CJEU’s case law (particularly Schrems 1: see here). Continue reading →

It is often helpful for the appellate courts to give judgments which provide guidance to assist decision-makers and lower courts in applying the law to different, but similar, cases. After all, if the law is being decided by reference to applicable principles, those ought to be able to give guidance beyond the very specific facts of the case. It has, however, been a disappointingly regular feature of the Court of Appeal’s approach to FOIA and EIR generally to disapprove of such guidance as the Upper Tribunal has sought to provide (fair enough) and replace that guidance with nothing at all (less fair). Continue reading →