Workfare and the First-tier Tribunal

Employment programmes for welfare recipients – often referred to as “workfare” – are highly controversial.  In Department for Work and Pensions v Information Commissioner and Zola (EA/2012/0207,0232 and 0233), the First-tier Tribunal considered three FOIA requests for information about companies participating in such programmes.  The Tribunal ordered disclosure, rejecting the Department’s reliance on the exemptions in FOIA section 43(2) (prejudice to commercial interests) and section 36(2)(c) (prejudice to the effect conduct of public affairs).

The case related to three programmes run by the DWP:  Mandatory Work Activity (MWA); Work Experience (WE); and the Work Programme (WP).  MWA provided short term work placements in the local community, usually with a charitable organisation.  WE provided placements for 18-21 year old Jobseekers’ Allowance claimants.  WP was aimed at those considered to be at risk of becoming long-term unemployed.  For each programme, the Government entered into contracts with providers, and these (or their sub-contractors) in turn arranged work placements with various organisations.  The three requests sought information as to the identity of organisations that had hosted placements.

The Information Commissioner required the DWP to provide the requested information.

The Commissioner rejected the DWP’s reliance on section 43(2), holding that the exemption was not engaged.  The Commissioner considered that the risk of providers withdrawing from the scheme as a result of disclosure would have been capable of engaging section 43(2), but that on the evidence any risk of this nature was speculative.  Any harm consisting of increased welfare costs was financial rather than commercial in nature, and did not engage section 43(2).  The Commissioner noted the existence of campaign groups and websites opposed to workfare, but said that the extent to which these had influenced any past withdrawals from the scheme was unclear.  In order to establish that section 43(2) was engaged, the Commissioner considered that the DWP would have had to indicate how many organisations would have been likely to withdraw as a result of disclosure, and what it would have cost to find alternative work placements; this had not been done.

The Commissioner also rejected the DWP’s reliance on section 36(2)(c).  Although the exemption was engaged, on the basis of the opinion of the qualified person (the then Minister for Employment), the public interest in maintaining the exemption was outweighed by the public interest in disclosure.

Before the Tribunal, the DWP disputed the Commissioner’s categorisation of higher welfare and related costs as being “financial” rather than “commercial” in nature.  It contended that the Commissioner had required an undue level of detail from the DWP in support of its claim that section 43(2) was engaged.  In relation to section 36(2)(c), the DWP argued that disclosure would have been likely to lead to the collapse of the MWA scheme.  As to the public interest in disclosure, the DWP contended that this had been greatly over-estimated by the Commissioner: there was already information in the public domain as to the kinds of employers that were participating; there was little public interest in knowing which specific organisations were taking part within any particular area.

The DWP placed evidence before the Tribunal about a survey carried out by the DWP in October and November 2012.  The DWP had sought information from contractors, their sub-contractors, and organisations that had hosted placements; the DWP had asked for information about the perceived impact of public awareness of their involvement in the programmes.  In March 2013 some organisations had provided further information in support of the DWP’s stance of not releasing the names of placement hosts, and this was also put before the Tribunal by the DWP.

The Tribunal’s conclusion was that section 43(2) was not engaged; and that, although section 36(2)(c) was engaged, the public interest balance favoured disclosure.  The Tribunal would have reached the same conclusion as to the public interest under section 43(2), had that exemption been engaged.

In relation to section 43(2), any prejudice relating to increased cost of welfare payments was held to be financial rather than commercial in nature, and irrelevant to the exemption.  The Tribunal therefore focused instead on the risk that disclosure would lead participating organisations to withdraw from the schemes.  It referred to the “Boycott Workface” website, and various news articles, concluding that media coverage and comment were inevitable and that there was always an inherent risk that participants would be identified.  At the time of the requests there were some 200 names of participating organisations already in the public domain.  There had not been a “media frenzy” as a result of publication of these names.  At most, seven of the 200 names had come in for criticism which had perhaps resulted, or could have resulted, in their withdrawal; but the evidence even in these cases was unpersuasive.  The speculative views elicited by the DWP’s survey carried considerably less weight than these real-life examples of what had actually happened where specific organisations had been named.

In relation to section 36(2)(c), the public interest in disclosure outweighed any interest in maintaining the exemption.  The schemes were controversial; it was important for the public to see and examine the schemes and how participants performed.

Overall, the case is an example of the Tribunal’s readiness to scrutinise closely any reliance on section 43(2).  Speculation about what might happen following disclosure – even when presented in the form of a survey – carried little weight.  The Tribunal was much more interested in the specific examples of providers that had been named in the past; and in these cases, the Tribunal considered that the evidence did not support the DWP’s position.  Overall, the Tribunal’s approach seems to be that private sector bodies that become involved in a controversial Government programme can expect to be exposed to a degree of scrutiny and criticism; and the Tribunal is reluctant to use this as a basis for protecting those organisations from the effect of disclosure under FOIA.

Timothy Pitt-Payne QC

Damages under section 13 DPA: Court of Appeal’s judgment in Halliday

I blogged a while ago about the ex tempore judgment from the Court of Appeal in a potentially groundbreaking case on damages under section 13 of the DPA, namely Halliday v Creation Consumer Finance [2013] EWCA Civ 333. The point of potential importance was that ‘nominal damages’ appeared to suffice for the purposes of section 13(1), thereby opening up section 13(2). In short, the point is that claimants under the DPA cannot be compensated for distress unless they have also suffered financial harm. A ‘nominal damages’ approach to the concept of financial harm threatened to make the DPA’s compensation regime dramatically more claimant-friendly.

The Court of Appeal’s full judgment is now available. As pointed out on Jon Baines’ blog, ground has not been broken: the ‘nominal damages’ point was a concession by the defendant rather than a determination by the Court. See paragraph 3 of the judgment of Lady Justice Arden:

“… this issue, which was the main issue of the proposed appeal to this court, is now academic as the respondent, CCF, concedes an award of nominal damages is “damage” for the purposes of the Directive and for the purposes of section 13(2) of the Data Protection Act 1998.”

Other potentially important points have also fallen somewhat flat. The question of whether UK law provided an adequate remedy for a breach of a right conferred by a European Directive fell away on the facts (“proof fell short in relation to the question of damage to reputation and credit”), while the provision for sanctions under Article 24 of Directive 95/46/EC was neither directly enforceable to Mr Halliday nor of assistance to him.

Still, the judgment is not without its notable points.

One is the recognition that compensation for harm suffered is a distinct matter from penalties for wrongdoing; the former is a matter for the courts in the DPA context, the latter a matter for the Information Commissioner and his monetary penalty powers. Such was the implication of paragraph 11:

“… it is not the function of the civil court, unless specifically provided for, to impose sanctions. That is done in other parts of the judicial system.”

Another point worth noting is Lady Justice Arden’s analysis of distress and the causation thereof. The distress must be caused by the breach, not by other factors such as (in this case) a failure to comply with a court order. See paragraph 20:

“Focusing on subsection (2), it is clear that the claimant has to be an individual, that he has to have suffered distress, and that the distress has to have been caused by contravention by a data controller of any of the requirements of the Act. In other words, this is a remedy which is not for distress at large but only for contravention of the data processing requirements. It also has to be distress suffered by the complainant and therefore would not include distress suffered by family members unless it was also suffered by him. When I say that it has to be caused by breach of the requirements of the Act, the distress which I accept Mr Halliday would have felt at the non-compliance of the order is not, at least directly, relevant because that is not distress by reason of the contravention by a data controller of the requirements of this Act. If the sole cause of the distress had been non-compliance with a court order, then that would have lain outside the Act unless it could be shown that it was in substance about the non-compliance with the Data Protection Act.”

The claimant had sought to draw an analogy with guidelines and banding for discrimination awards as set by Vento v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2013] 1 ICR 31. The Court of Appeal was not attracted. See paragraph 26:

“In answer to that point, the field of discrimination is, it seems to me, not a helpful guide for the purposes of data protection. Discrimination is generally accompanied by loss of equality of opportunity with far-reaching effects and is liable to cause distinct and well-known distress to the complainant.”

Finally, Lady Justice Arden commented as follows concerning the level of the compensation to be awarded on the facts of this case: “in my judgment the sum to be awarded should be of a relatively modest nature since it is not the intention of the legislation to produce some kind of substantial award. It is intended to be compensation, and thus I would consider it sufficient to render an award in the sum of £750” (paragraph 36).

Lord Justice Lloyd (who, along with Mr Justice Ryder agreed with Lady Justice Arden) did pause to think about a submission on this question ‘if you were so distressed, why did you not complain immediately?’, but concluded that (paragraph 47):

“I confess that I was somewhat impressed at one point by Mr Capon’s submission that it was a surprise, if Mr Halliday was so distressed by this contravention, that he did not immediately protest upon discovering, in response to his first credit reference enquiry, the fact of the contravention, and indeed he did not protest until about a month after the second report had been obtained. But I bear in mind, in response to that, Mr Halliday’s comment that he had had such difficulty in getting any sensible response, or indeed any response, out of CCF at the earlier stage, that it is perhaps less surprising that he did not immediately protest. In any event, the period in question is not a very lengthy one between his discovery of the contravention by his first reference request and his taking action in July. Accordingly, it does not seem to me that that is a matter that should be taken to reduce my assessment of the degree of distress that he suffered.”

Robin Hopkins

Information rights: proposed legislative changes and more

Earlier this week, James Goudie QC blogged on the Intellectual Property Bill’s amendment to FOIA, introducing a new qualified exemption (section 22A) for continuing programmes of research intended for future publication. On the issue of research – which featured prominently in submissions from the university sector during FOIA’s post-legislative scrutiny health-check – this would bring FOIA into line with its Scottish counterpart. For an informative discussion of this topic, see this post from Kit Good.

Interestingly, that post refers to an ICO decision notice (FS50163282 of 29 March 2010) about “tree ring” data, a method used to analyse wood from archaeological sites to determine past climates. The ICO found that Queen’s University Belfast was not entitled to rely on (among other exceptions) regulations 12(4)(d) of the EIRs (material which is still in the course of completion, unfinished documents or incomplete data). As it happens, the Tribunal has today issued a decision concerned with tree ring data in a university research context: McIntyre v IC and UEA, EA/2012/0156. The Tribunal noted the ICO’s note of caution concerning ever-evolving research data: “this argument should not be used to withhold tree-ring chronologies endlessly, by arguing that they are always a ‘work in progress’”. However, on the facts of the case the Tribunal upheld UEA’s reliance on regulation 12(4)(d), as supported by the ICO.

This has not been FOIA’s only outing in Parliament this week. An early day motion was tabled on Tuesday of this week expressing concern at the Government’s proposal to make cost restrictions more public authority-friendly. The motion is worded as follows:

“That this House notes that the Government is proposing to make it easier for public authorities to refuse Freedom of Information requests on cost grounds in order to prevent disproportionate use of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 by some requesters; expresses concern that requests by those making moderate use of the legislation will also be more easily refused under the proposals; is particularly concerned at the proposal that the time which authorities spend considering whether to release information should be taken into account when calculating whether the cost limit has been reached; further notes that this proposal was expressly rejected by the Justice Committee in its post-legislative review of the Act; believes that this proposal will penalise requests raising new or complex issues which will inevitably require substantial time to consider; observes that the Government’s objective will in any case be achieved following recent decisions of an Upper Tribunal that requests which involve a disproportionate, manifestly unjustified, inappropriate or improper use of the Act can be refused as vexatious; and calls on the Government not to proceed with its proposals.”

The motion’s primary sponsor is Richard Shepherd. At present, there are 12 signatories. Maurice Frankel of the Campaign for FOI is urging more MPs to take up the cause.

Turning from FOIA to information rights concerns of a data protection variety, the Care Bill was introduced in the House of Lords last week. Notably, it contains an express provision making the provision of “false or misleading information” an offence (subject of course to the statutory definitions being met). Clause 81 provides as follows:

(1) A care provider of a specified description commits an offence if—

(a) it supplies, publishes or otherwise makes available information of a specified description,

(b) the supply, publication or making available by other means of information of that description is required under an enactment or other legal obligation, and

(c) the information is false or misleading in a material respect.

The aims of this clause are not confined to matters affecting personal privacy – indeed, the explanatory document suggests it is confined to ‘management information’. There may, however, be some crossover with information on individual cases, particularly in ‘low cell count’ cases where individuals could be identified from higher-level data. The Data Protection 1998 does not use the language of “misleading” – focusing instead on inaccuracy and fairness. There are often DPA-related grievances, however, in which “misleading” is an excellent summary of the data subject’s concern.

Robin Hopkins

Thirteen deadly sins: new ICO guidance on vexatious requests

On Wednesday, the ICO launched its new guidance on section 14 (vexatious requests) on Wednesday. This follows the Upper Tribunal’s recent decisions on this exemption (Panopticon passim), as well as decisions such as Salford City Council v IC and TieKey Accounts (EA/2012/0047) concerning reliance on section 14 to avoid incurring unreasonable cost burdens.

The ICO’s long-standing 5 indicators are supplanted by a new list of 13 indicators – though the emphasis remains on their not being intended as pseudo-statutory tests (and thus they are not really ‘deadly sins’). The thirteen indicators are (in no particular order):

abusive or aggressive language; burden on the authority; personal grudges; unreasonable persistence; unfounded accusations; intransigence; frequent or overlapping requests; deliberate intention to cause annoyance; scattergun approach; disproportionate effort; no obvious intent to obtain information; futile requests; frivolous requests.

The guidance addresses such topics as round robins, fishing expeditions and requesters acting in concert/as part of a campaign, all of which arise frequently for consideration by public authorities. There is also a section on “recommended actions before making a final decision” (paragraphs 93-97) which public authorities would be wise to consider with an eye on complaints to the ICO from dissatisfied recipients of section 14 notices.

For discussions of the new guidance, see these blog posts from the ICO’s Deputy Commissioner, Graham Smith, and also from FOI Man.

Robin Hopkins

Google: autocomplete and the frontiers of privacy

Unsurprisingly, the frontiers of privacy and data protection law are often explored and extended by reference to what Google does. Panopticon has, for example, covered disputes over Google Street View (on which a US lawsuit was settled in recent months), Google’s status as a ‘publisher’ of blogs containing allegedly defamatory material (see Tamiz v Google [2013] EWCA Civ 68) and its responsibility for search results directing users to allegedly inaccurate or out-of-date personal data (see Google Spain v Agencia Espanola de Proteccion de Datos (application C-131/12), in which judgment is due in the coming months).

A recent decision of a German appellate court appears to have extended the frontiers further. The case (BGH, VI ZR 269/12 of 14th May 2013) concerned Google’s ‘autocomplete’ function. When the complainants’ names were typed into Google’s search bar, the autocomplete function added the ensuing words “Scientology” and “fraud”. This was not because there was lots of content linking that individual with those terms. Rather, it was because these were the terms other Google users had most frequently searched for in conjunction with that person’s name. This was due to rumours the truth or accuracy of which the complainants denied. They complained that the continuing association of their names with these terms infringed their rights to personality and reputation as protected by German law (Articles 823(1) and 1004 of the German Civil Code).

In the Google Spain case, Google has said that the responsibility lies with the generators of the content, not with the search engine which offers users that content. In the recent German case, Google has argued in a similar vein that the autocomplete suggestions are down to what other users have searched for, not what Google says or does.

In allowing the complainants’ appeals, the Federal Court of Justice in Karlsruhe has disagreed with Google. The result is that once Google has been alerted to the fact that an autocomplete suggestion links someone to libellous words, it must remove that suggestion. The case is well covered by Jeremy Phillips at IPKat and by Karin Matussek of Bloomberg in Berlin.

The case is important in terms of the frontiers of legal protection for personal integrity and how we allocate responsibility for harm. Google says that, in these contexts, it is a facilitator not a generator. It says it should not liable for what people write (see Tamiz and Google Spain), not for what they search for (the recent German case). Not for the first time, courts in Europe have allocated responsibility differently.

Notably, this case was not brought under data protection law. In principle, it seems that such complaints could be expressed in data protection terms. Perhaps, if the EU’s final Data Protection Regulation retains the severe penalty provisions proposed in the draft version, data protection will move centre-stage in these sorts of cases.

Robin Hopkins

New FoIA Exemption

Following the Queen’s Speech, an Intellectual Property Bill has been introduced in the House of Lords.  Clause 19 inserts a new exemption into the FoIA (Section 22A).  The exemption is for continuing programmes of research intended for future publication.  Subsection 1(a) of Clause 19 provides that information is exempt from a Section 1(1)(b) FoIA disclosure requirement if it relates to information obtained in the course of, or derived from, a programme of continuing research that is intended for future publication.  Subsection (1)(b) of the new Clause, however, provides that the information will be exempt only if disclosure would, or would be likely to, prejudice a matter listed in that subsection.  The exemption will not be an absolute exemption. It will be subject to the public interest balance test.  Public authorities will not be required to confirm or deny that they hold Section 22A information if, or to the extent that, compliance would, or would be likely to prejudice, any of the matters mentioned in subsection (1)(b).  The Government does not consider that the new exemption raises any issues of compatibility under ECHR Article 10.