Tag: surveillance

RIPA: hacked voicemails and undercover officers

Posted on | by Robin Hopkins

The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) has featured prominently in the news in recent weeks, both as regards undercover police officers/“covert human intelligence sources” and as regards the phone-hacking scandal.

Hacked voicemails

This morning, the Court of Appeal gave judgment in Edmonson, Weatherup, Brooks, Coulson & Kuttner v R [2013] EWCA Crim 1026. As is well known, the appellants face charges arising out of the News of the World phone-hacking controversy – specifically, conspiring unlawfully to intercept communications in the course of their transmission without lawful authority contrary to section 1(1) of the Criminal Law Act 1977.

The communications in question are voicemails. Under section 1(1)(b) of RIPA, it is an offence intentionally to intercept, without lawful authority, any communication in the course of its transmission by means of a public telecommunications system (my emphasis). The central provision is section 2(7) of RIPA:

“(7) For the purposes of this section the times while a communication is being transmitted by means of a telecommunication system shall be taken to include any time when the system by means of which the communication is being, or has been, transmitted is used for storing it in a manner that enables the intended recipient to collect it or otherwise to have access to it.”

The appellants applied to have the charges dismissed on the grounds that the words “in the course of transmission” in section 1(1) of RIPA do not extend to voicemail messages once they have been listened to (by the intended recipient, that is, rather than by any alleged phone-hacker). They argued that the ordinary meaning of “transmission” is conveyance from one person or place to another and that section 2(7) is intended to extend the concept of “transmission” only so as to cover periods of transient storage that arising through modern phone and email usage, and when the intended recipient is not immediately available. Thus, once the message has been listened to, it can no longer be “in the course of transmission”.

The point had previously been decided against the appellant. The Court of Appeal (the Lord Chief Justice, Lloyd Jones LJ, Openshaw J) took a similar view. While it accepted that the application of section 2(7) may differ as between, for example, voicemails and emails, “there is nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that section 2(7) should be read in such a limited way” (as the appellants had contended) (paragraph 23). Further, the words “has been transmitted” in section 2(7) “make entirely clear that the course of transmission may continue notwithstanding that the voicemail message has already been received and read by the intended recipient” (paragraph 26).

The same conclusion was reached by focusing on the mischief which section 2(7) is intended to remedy, “namely unauthorized access to communications, whether oral or text, whilst they remain on the system by which they were transmitted. As the prosecution submits, unlawful access and intrusion is not somehow less objectionable because the message has been read or listened to by the intended recipient before the unauthorized access takes place” (paragraph 28, quoting an earlier judgment in this matter from Fulford LJ).

The Court accepted that section 2(7) went further than the prohibitions imposed by Directive 97/66/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the telecommunications sector (which RIPA sought to implement) and its successor, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector (which postdates RIPA).  The Court found, however, that the Directives imposed minimum harmonisation; Parliament was entitled to go further and to set higher standards for the protection of privacy of electronic communications, provided that those additional obligations are compatible with EU law (paragraph 42).

Both the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Computer Misuse Act 1990 also raised their heads. The DPA, for example, contains a public interest defence which is not available under RIPA. It was argued that this risked creation parallel offences without parallel defences, violating the principle of legal certainty. This submission too was rejected (paragraphs 44-45).

The cases will now proceed to trial, apparently to commence in September.

Undercover officers

As regards the activities of undercover police officers, the major issue this week has concerned the alleged smearing of the family and friends of Stephen Lawrence: see for example The Guardian’s Q&A session with undercover-officer-turned-whistleblower Peter Francis.

The other major ongoing case regarding a former undercover officer concerns Mark Kennedy, who (together with others) infiltrated political and environmental activists over a period of years. Claims were commenced in the High Court, with part of the conduct complained of involving ensuing sexual relations between activists/their partners and undercover officers.

Earlier this year, J and others v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2013] EWHC 32 (QB) saw part of the claims struck out. The Court held that the Investigatory Powers Tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction over the claims under the Human Rights Act 1998; it struck out these parts accordingly. It observed that conduct breaching Article 3 (inhuman and degrading treatment) – which included the claims relating to sexual activity – could not be authorised under RIPA, but conduct breaching Article 8 (privacy) could be authorised. Sexual activity with undercover officers did not necessarily engage Article 3.

Those parts of the claims which did not concern the Human Rights Act 1998 (actions at common law and for alleged breaches of statutory duties) were not exclusively within the Investigatory Powers Tribunal’s jurisdiction and were thus not struck out as an abuse of process, notwithstanding the police’s difficulties in presenting its case due to the ‘neither confirm nor deny’ approach to covert sources.

Unlike with the phone-hacking cases, it is not clear when this case will resume before the Court/Tribunal.

Robin Hopkins

New CCTV Code of Practice: surveillance and the protection of freedoms

Posted on | by Robin Hopkins

Surveillance of the covert and digital variety has been dominating the news of late. The legal contours of the practices leaked by Edward Snowden (the NSA’s obtaining of internet metadata) and covered by The Guardian (most recently, GCHQ’s monitoring of certain communications of ‘friendly’ foreign allies) may be matters of some debate.

In the meantime, the legal contours of a more overt and physical variety of surveillance – CCTV – have been somewhat clarified.

Panopticon indeed.

As its name suggests, the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 expressed the incoming Coalition Government’s commitment to keeping in check the state’s surveillance of ordinary citizens. By that Act (sections 29-36), the Home Secretary was to present to Parliament a Code of Practice governing the use of surveillance camera systems including CCTV and Automatic Number Plate Recognition (ANPR). Following a consultation exercise – the response to which can be read here – the Home Secretary has now done so. The Code was laid before Parliament on 4 June 2013. A draft order (the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (Code of Practice for Surveillance Camera Systems and Specification of Relevant Authorities) Order 2013) is currently being considered by Parliament’s Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments.

Pending its coming into force, Panopticon summarises the key features of the new Code.

To whom does the Code apply?

The Code imposes duties on ‘relevant authorities’, which are those listed at section 33(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 – in the main, local authorities and policing authorities.

The draft order proposes to add the following to the list of relevant authorities:

(a) The chief constable of the British Transport Police;

(b) The Serious Organised Crime Agency;

(c) The chief constable of the Civil Nuclear Constabulary; and

(d) The chief constable of the Ministry of Defence Police.

The Code recognises that concern about the use of surveillance cameras often extends beyond these sorts of full-blooded ‘public’ authorities. It recognises that the list of relevant authorities may need to be expanded in future to encompass shopping centres, sports grounds, schools, transport centres and the like.

For now, however, only those listed as ‘relevant authorities’ are subject to the duties imposed by the Code. Others who use such surveillance systems are ‘encouraged’ to abide by the Code.

What duty is imposed by the Code?

The Code imposes a ‘have regard to’ duty. In other words, relevant authorities are required to have regard to the Code when exercising any of the functions to which the Code relates. As regards its legal effects:

“A failure on the part of any person to act in accordance with any provision of this code does not of itself make that person liable to criminal or civil proceedings. This code is, however, admissible in evidence in criminal or civil proceedings, and a court or tribunal may take into account a failure by a relevant authority to have regard to the code in determining a question in any such proceedings” (paragraph 1.16).

It may well be that the Code also weighs heavily with the ICO in its consideration of any complaints about the use of surveillance cameras breaching the DPA 1998.

Remember that the Home Office Code sits alongside and does not replace the ICO’s CCTV Code of Practice.

What types of activity are covered by the new Code?

Relevant authorities must have regard to the Code ‘when exercising any of the functions to which the Code relates’. This encompasses the operation and use of and the processing data derived from surveillance camera systems in public places in England and Wales, regardless of whether there is any live viewing or recording of images and associated data.

The Code does not apply to covert surveillance, as defined under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000.

What about third party contractors?

Where a relevant authority instructs or authorises a third party to use surveillance cameras, that third party is not under the ‘have regard to’ duty imposed by the Code. That duty does, however, apply to the relevant authority’s arrangements.

By paragraph 1.11:

“The duty to have regard to this code also applies when a relevant authority uses a third party to discharge relevant functions covered by this code and where it enters into partnership arrangements. Contractual provisions agreed after this code comes into effect with such third party service providers or partners must ensure that contractors are obliged by the terms of the contract to have regard to the code when exercising functions to which the code relates.”

The approach

The guiding philosophy of the Code is one of surveillance by consent:

 “The government considers that wherever overt surveillance in public places is in pursuit of a legitimate aim and meets a pressing need, any such surveillance should be characterised as surveillance by consent, and such consent on the part of the community must be informed consent and not assumed by a system operator…. [legitimacy] in the eyes of the public is based upon a general consensus of support that follows from transparency about their powers, demonstrating integrity in exercising those powers and their accountability for doing so” (paragraph 1.5).

In a nutshell, the expectation is this:

“The decision to use any surveillance camera technology must, therefore, be consistent with a legitimate aim and a pressing need. Such a legitimate aim and pressing need must be articulated clearly and documented as the stated purpose for any deployment. The technical design solution for such a deployment should be proportionate to the stated purpose rather than driven by the availability of funding or technological innovation. Decisions over the most appropriate technology should always take into account its potential to meet the stated purpose without unnecessary interference with the right to privacy and family life. Furthermore, any deployment should not continue for longer than necessary” (paragraph 2.4).

The guiding principles

The Code then sets out 12 guiding principles which systems operators should follow:

(1) Use of a surveillance camera system must always be for a specified purpose which is in pursuit of a legitimate aim and necessary to meet an identified pressing need.

(2) The use of a surveillance camera system must take into account its effect on individuals and their privacy, with regular reviews to ensure its use remains justified.

(3) There must be as much transparency in the use of a surveillance camera system as possible, including a published contact point for access to information and complaints.

(4) There must be clear responsibility and accountability for all surveillance camera system activities including images and information collected, held and used.

(5) Clear rules, policies and procedures must be in place before a surveillance camera system is used, and these must be communicated to all who need to comply with them.

(6) No more images and information should be stored than that which is strictly required for the stated purpose of a surveillance camera system, and such images and information should be deleted once their purposes have been discharged.

(7) Access to retained images and information should be restricted and there must be clearly defined rules on who can gain access and for what purpose such access is granted; the disclosure of images and information should only take place when it is necessary for such a purpose or for law enforcement purposes.

(8) Surveillance camera system operators should consider any approved operational, technical and competency standards relevant to a system and its purpose and work to meet and maintain those standards.

(9) Surveillance camera system images and information should be subject to appropriate security measures to safeguard against unauthorised access and use.

(10) There should be effective review and audit mechanisms to ensure legal requirements, policies and standards are complied with in practice, and regular reports should be published.

(11) When the use of a surveillance camera system is in pursuit of a legitimate aim, and there is a pressing need for its use, it should then be used in the most effective way to support public safety and law enforcement with the aim of processing images and information of evidential value.

(12) Any information used to support a surveillance camera system which compares against a reference database for matching purposes should be accurate and kept up to date.

Points to note

The Code then fleshes out those guiding principles in more detail. Here are some notable points:

Such systems “should not be used for other purposes that would not have justified its establishment in the first place” (paragraph 3.1.3).

“People do, however, have varying and subjective expectations of privacy with one of the variables being situational. Deploying surveillance camera systems in public places where there is a particularly high expectation of privacy, such as toilets or changing rooms, should only be done to address a particularly serious problem that cannot be addressed by less intrusive means” (paragraph 3.2.1).

“Any proposed deployment that includes audio recording in a public place is likely to require a strong justification of necessity to establish its proportionality. There is a strong presumption that a surveillance camera system must not be used to record conversations as this is highly intrusive and unlikely to be justified” (paragraph 3.2.2).

“Any use of facial recognition or other biometric characteristic recognition systems needs to be clearly justified and proportionate in meeting the stated purpose, and be suitably validated. It should always involve human intervention before decisions are taken that affect an individual adversely” (paragraph 3.3.3).

“This [the requirement to publicise as much as possible about the use of a system] is not to imply that the exact location of surveillance cameras should always be disclosed if to do so would be contrary to the interests of law enforcement or national security” (paragraph 3.3.6).

“It is important that there are effective safeguards in place to ensure the forensic integrity of recorded images and information and its usefulness for the purpose for which it is intended to be used. Recorded material should be stored in a way that maintains the integrity of the image and information, with particular importance attached to ensuring that meta data (e.g. time, date and location) is recorded reliably, and compression of data does not reduce its quality” (paragraph 4.12.2).

Enforcement

The Surveillance Camera Commissioner is a statutory appointment made by the Home Secretary under section 34 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012. The Commissioner has no enforcement or inspection powers. However, in encouraging compliance with the Code, he “should consider how best to ensure that relevant authorities are aware of their duty to have regard for the Code and how best to encourage its voluntary adoption by other operators of surveillance camera systems” (paragraph 5.3). The Commissioner is/is to be assisted by a non-statutory Advisory Council with its own specialist subgroups.

Given the limited remit of the Surveillance Camera Commissioner, it may be that the Code shows its teeth more effectively in complaints to the ICO and/or the courts.

Robin Hopkins

Surveillance and RIPA: Radio 4 discussion

Posted on | by Ben Hooper

I took part in what will hopefully prove to be an interesting discussion of surveillance and RIPA in an episode of Clive Anderson’s “Unreliable Evidence” that will be broadcast at 8pm today on Radio 4 (and available on the iplayer thereafter). The show was recorded prior to the recent leaks regarding US surveillance activities, and so focuses on the UK perspective. The other panel members were Eric Metcalfe (former director of human rights policy at Justice, now a barrister at Monckton Chambers) and solicitor Simon McKay.

Ben Hooper

Surveillance: RIPA and the Communications Data Bill

Posted on | by Robin Hopkins

The Communications Data Bill, shelved amid political heavy weather, is back on the agenda in the wake of last week’s Woolwich murder. Today for example, Conservative MP and former policing minister Nick Herbert wrote an article in The Times in support of the Bill and responding to those who have called it a ‘snooper’s charter’.

One of the more detailed critiques of Mr Herbert’s article came from Big Brother Watch. Part of its argument was that the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) already provides for necessary surveillance – indeed, RIPA goes further because, unlike the Communications Data Bill, it allows for the actual content of communications to be intercepted in appropriate circumstances

Big Brother Watch’s article noted, however, problems with the use of intercept evidence in criminal trials. As regards the admissibility of surveillance resulting in the recording of conversations however, a very recent Court of Appeal judgment brings good news.

Turner v R [2013] EWCA Crim 642 concerned an appeal against a murder conviction. The evidence included extracts from some 300 hours’ worth of conversations which had been recorded as part of an intrusive surveillance operation authorised under RIPA.

The single ground of appeal against conviction arose from the rejection by Dobbs J of the submission that the indictment should be stayed as an abuse of process arising from the use of intrusive covert surveillance in the appellant’s home; alternatively, that the evidence derived from that surveillance was unfairly admitted in evidence, when it should have been excluded under s.78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.

The Court of Appeal dismissed these arguments. It had particular regard to the importance of respecting legal professional privilege when gathering evidence through covert means.

The Lord Chief Jusitce concluded that (paragraph 28):

“The surveillance was lawful. The relevant disclosure took place. The record of incriminating conversations was unchallenged. We understand that there may be extreme cases in which the prosecuting authorities (using the words in a comprehensive way) may interfere so significantly with the legal privilege of a defendant that the very integrity of the administration of justice may be undermined. That, however, did not happen here. Lawful covert surveillance produced damaging evidence against all three defendants. The process worked lawfully: any flaws were minor and short, and inconsequential”.

As to admissibility, he said this (paragraph 30):

“The only unfairness was that the appellant chose to say the things that he did because he did not realise that they were being recorded. The object of covert surveillance of the kind deployed in this case was to discover the truth, and, the evidence of what the appellant said about the death of the deceased was put before the jury while anything containing even a whisper of conversations protected by legal privilege was excluded. That was not unfair.”

Those arguing that RIPA is a fit-for-purpose surveillance tool will no doubt find support in this judgment.

Robin Hopkins

Important developments in surveillance law: RIPA and CCTV

Posted on | by Robin Hopkins

Important changes to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 come into force from 1 November 2012, thanks to the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 (Commencement No. 2) Order 2012, passed last week. This is an extremely important development for local authorities.

Local authorities are empowered under RIPA to use three surveillance techniques: directed surveillance, the deployment of a Covert Human Intelligence Source (CHIS) and accessing communications data. Early in its term, the Coalition government indicated that it would impose additional safeguards on local authorities’ use of such powers, responding in part to concerns aired by Big Brother Watch and others (see our post here and the recent ‘Grim RIPA’ report here). Chapter 2 of Part 2 of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 Act amended RIPA so as to require local authorities to obtain the approval of a magistrate for any authorisation for the use of a covert investigatory technique.

The procedure for obtaining judicial approval may be much like that involved in obtaining search warrants. It remains to be seen how magistrates scrutinise the reasoning and evidence supporting an authorisation so as to ensure that the conditions laid down by RIPA – in particular, necessity and proportionality – are satisfied. Ibrahim Hasan has discussed the changes in his Local Government Lawyer piece here.

Last week also saw a second important announcement on surveillance. The government has announced that it is busy with preparatory work on a new CCTV code of practice, with the aim of consulting on the draft code over the autumn and bringing the new one into force in April 2013. Authorities specified in s. 33(5) of the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012 have a duty to have regard to the code, and other system operators will be encouraged to adopt it on a voluntary basis.

The Home Office Minister, Jeremy Browne MP, told the House of Commons last week that the government is “committed to ensuring that any deployment in public places of surveillance cameras, including close circuit television (CCTV) and automatic number plate recognition (ANPR), is appropriate, proportionate, transparent and effective in meeting its stated purpose”.

Oversight of – and independent recommendations about – the new code will fall to Andrew Rennison, who will remain in post as both surveillance camera commissioner and forensic science regulator until February 2014.

If one adds the Local Authorities (Executive Arrangements) (Meetings and Access to Information) (England) Regulations 2012, also passed last week (see my post here), this is clearly a time of great flux in terms of the information law landscape for local authorities in particular.

Robin Hopkins

ICO’S SURVEILLANCE REPORT 2010: ‘SLEEPWALKING’ RISK REMAINS; ‘PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENTS’ PROPOSED FOR NEW LEGISLATION

Posted on | by Robin Hopkins

The Information Commissioner has delivered his latest report to the Home Affairs Select Committee on “the state of surveillance” in the UK. The report traces privacy-related developments since the Commissioner’s 2006 report on the same theme, which memorably observed that the UK may be “sleepwalking into a surveillance society”. According to the November 2010 report, that warning

 “… is no less cogent in 2010 than it was several years ago. It is not being suggested that the UK is a ‘police state’ or that there are surveillance conspiracies afoot against the public. Neither the 2006 report nor this one supports such an assumption, and evidence for it is lacking. Much of what is taken to be surveillance is done for benign reasons and has beneficial effects on individuals and society. But much surveillance also goes beyond the limits of what is tolerable in a society based on the rule of law and human rights, one of which is the right to privacy.”

The report provides an illuminating summary of trends in (amongst others) the use of CCTV, body scanning and border control (including ‘ethnic targeting’ for security searches), workplace monitoring, social networking, ‘crowdsourcing’, the monitoring of protest activities and even the use of unmanned drones. Scrutiny is also given to a number of governmental policy tools, such as databases and the use of ‘social sorting’ (eg into groups such as ‘high cost, high risk’ social groups who are vulnerable to social exclusion’) to develop targeted welfare strategies.

As regards private-sector online commerce, the Commissioner recommends a number of measures to correct what he describes as the “worrying trend particularly with those who provide on-line services not to have thought through the privacy implications of their activities and given users robust privacy settings as a default”.

What to do about the risks identified in the report? The ICO’s recommendations focus principally on overhauling the legislative process insofar as it affects privacy, by introducing: 

  • a requirement for a privacy impact assessment to be presented during the parliamentary process where legislative measures have a particular impact on privacy;
  • an opportunity for the Information Commissioner to provide a reasoned opinion to Parliament on measures that engage concerns within his areas of competence, and
  • a legal requirement to make sure all new laws that engage significant privacy concerns undergo post-legislative scrutiny to ensure they are being implemented and used as intended by Parliament.

If implemented, these measures would add substantially to the ICO’s clout as the guardian of privacy.

The report can be found here, with the accompanying press release from the ICO here.