ACCESS TO PROPERTY SEARCH INFORMATION – TEST CASE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

This has been a particularly busy week so far as the law relating to accessing property search information is concerned. On 15 March, I blogged about a new Information Rights Tribunal judgment on the application of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (EIR) to requests for property search information – see my post. On 17-18 March 2010, the Administrative Court (Hickinbotham J) heard a test case judicial review of the policy of City of York Council on access to and charges for property search information under the Local Authorities (England) (Charges for Property Searches) Regulations 2008. The Claimant, Onesearch Direct Limited, maintains that all local authorities have an obligation under the 2008 Regulations to grant it direct access to their property records, and to charge no more than the cost of doing so. It is understood that Onesearch are pursuing their claim under the 2008 Regulations rather than the EIR in part because of the administrative inconvenience of having to wait up to 20 days to receive a response under the EIR (see r. 5(2) EIR). Judgment is expected on Friday 20 March 2010. Jason Coppel represents the Council.

CHARGING FOR PROPERTY SEARCH INFORMATION – IMPORTANT NEW TRIBUNAL JUDGMENT

Anybody who has ever bought a property will know that property searches must be conducted as part of the process. Originally, it was the buyer who had to conducted the searches. However, following the introduction of the HIPs regime in 2007, it is now the seller’s responsibility. In tandem with the introduction of the HIPs regime, the Government introduced the Local Authorities (England) (Charges for Property Searches) Regulations 2008, which empower local authorities to charge for making property search information available to members of the public. However, importantly, those Regulations have to be applied in a way which does not, in effect, cut across the access regime afforded under the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (EIR). This means that, in practice, it will often be the EIR which governs whether and to what extent local authorities can charge for making property search information available

In the recent case of East Riding of Yorkshire v IC & York Place, the Tribunal was called upon to determine the question of whether, on an application of the EIR, particular property search information should have been made available to a property search company free of charge. More particularly, the Tribunal had to determine whether the local authority: (a) was required to allow the company to inspect the information free of charge at the local authorities premises; or (b) was entitled to refuse inspection and make the information available by way of hard copy documents, for which a charge could be levied under r. 8 EIR. After having made a number of findings as to the weakness of certain aspects of the council’s evidence, the Tribunal went on to hold that the council ought in fact to have permitted the company to inspect the relevant records free of charge. This judgment is important both because of its careful examination of the principles relating to charging under the EIR and because of its implications for local authority charging regimes in respect of property search information. 11KBW’s Jane Oldham appeared on behalf of the council and Anya Proops appeared on behalf of the Information Commissioner. 

Moray Council

The Scotsman reports that Moray Council has become the first in Scotland to put every FoI request it receives, and the responses, on its website. Private details of the requester are witheld. The requests are placed into groups, such as individuals, media, government researchers, etc. This will enable the public to see where requests are coming from, what sort of information is being asked for, what level of detail can be provided, and the level of investigation required by council staff to produce the information.” Headline perhaps : ” Tartan Transparency

Protecting the Anonymity of Parties – EAT Supplements Its Own Rules of Procedure

On 5 March 2010, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (President Underhill presiding) gave a judgment on the question of whether it had powers to protect the anonymity of a party in a case involving allegations of sexual offences – A v B (UKEAT/0206/09/SM). The background to the judgment was that a claimant had been granted permanent anonymity by the Employment Tribunal under the Employment Tribunals (Constitution and Rules of Procedure) Regulations 2004 Sch.1 para.49. The anonymity order had been made in circumstances where the claimant, who was claiming unfair dismissal, had been dismissed in response to a disclosure by police that he had been involved in paedophile activity in Cambodia and was believed to represent a risk to children. The Claimant had in fact been acquitted in the Cambodian courts and there was no reason to believe he faced prosecution in the UK. On appeal against the tribunal’s judgment to the EAT, the question arose as to whether the EAT had power to maintain the anonymisation when dealing with the appeal. This was a difficult question to resolve because, on their face, the EAT Rules 1993 read together with the Employment Tribunals Act 1996 did not provide for such a power. In a judgment which reflects the overriding importance of human rights considerations, the EAT held that it did have such a power. In reaching this conclusion, the EAT took into account: (a) that the loss of the claimant’s anonymity would involve a serious breach of his convention rights, particularly the Article 8 right to privacy; (b) that, on the facts of the case, the need to protect the claimant’s privacy under Article 8 outweighed the imperative towards freedom of expression embodied in Article 10 of the Convention; and (c) that, in the circumstances, s. 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 required the EAT to interpret its powers so as to include a power to protect the claimant’s anonymity.

In the course of its judgment, the EAT considered the very recent judgment of the Supreme Court in HM Treasury v Ahmed [2010] UKSC 1; [2010] 2 WLR 325. In that case, the Supreme Court held that the old common law rule that a party forfeited his right to privacy if he chose to bring proceedings (subject to certain limited statutory exceptions) required modification in the light of the Convention. It concluded that, in a case where full publication of the proceedings would have an impact on the Article 8 rights of a party, the court will have to conduct a balancing exercise between that right and the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 (see per Lord Roger, para. 43). This is precisely the balance which the EAT sought to strike in the Av B case.

Hearing Closed evidence in Civil Claims – Al Rawi in the Court of Appeal

Next week, the Court of Appeal will hear an appeal by Bisher Al Rawi and other former Guantanamo detainees against Silber J’s decision that the court does have the power, in the context of civil claims for damages, to hear evidence in the absence of the claimant and the public – see Al Rawi v Security Services & Ors and see also my earlier post on Silber J’s judgment. If the Court of Appeal upholds the decision, the High Court will determine at a future hearing whether to adopt a closed process in this case. Karen Steyn appears for the Respondents.