Revising FOIA?

Posted on | by Timothy Pitt-Payne KC

Tucked away in Jack Straw’s House of Commons statement (24th February 2009) about the veto on disclosure of the Iraq War Cabinet minutes is the following intriguing passage:

Shortly after he became Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister established a high-level inquiry into the 30-year rule under the chairmanship of Mr. Paul Dacre of the Daily Mail. That report, published last month, proposed a reduction from 30 to 15 years of the time after which Cabinet minutes and other papers would automatically be released. I have already told the House that the Government favour a substantial reduction in the 30-year limit. In that context, the report also recommended that we consider protection under the Act for certain categories of information.

The reference to the Dacre Report relates to the following section in chapter 8 of the Report:

8.7 As we noted in Chapter Five, there are genuine concerns among some ministers and civil servants about the early release of particularly sensitive types of papers … Given that we are recommending a substantial reduction to the 30 year rule, we believe that the government may wish to look again at the exemptions set out in the FoI Act.

8.8 We therefore recommend that, in parallel with the adoption of a 15 year rule, the government, in consultation with interested parties, may wish to consider whether there is a case for enhanced protection of such categories of information.

So what may be under consideration is a change along the following lines.  The 30 year rule would be replaced by a 15 year rule; and at the same time some categories of information that are at present covered by a qualified exemption under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 would become subject to absolute exemption.  Possible candidates for this treatment might be Cabinet minutes, or some forms of policy advice in central Government.  A change of this nature might not even need primary legislation; an attempt could be made to implement the change by making an order under section 7(3) of the Freedom of Information Act.  This was the technique that was used in the recent (abandoned) attempt to amend FOIA in relation to MPs expenses:  see https://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7839281.stm

I would make two brief comments.  One is that the Dacre proposals in relation to the 30 year rule envisage that the change to a 15 year rule would be made over a long transitional period, coming fully into effect by 2025.  Presumably any change in the FOIA exemptions would not be subject to any corresponding transition.  A second is that the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (EIR) could not be amended in the same way, since they implement a European Directive.  So if the FOIA exemptions are tightened, expect a great deal more argument about whether particular requests fall within FOIA or EIR.

For Jack Straw’s statement see:

https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmhansrd/cm090224/debtext/90224-0004.htm#09022444000162

For the Dacre Report see:

https://www2.nationalarchives.gov.uk/30yrr/30-year-rule-report.pdf

Court of Appeal Gives Judgment in Ofcom Case

Posted on | by Anya Proops KC

On 20 February 2009, judgment was handed down in the case of Office of Communications v Information Commissioner [2009] EWCA Civ 90. This is the first case under the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (EIR) to be heard by the Court of Appeal. The Information Commissioner was represented by Akhlaq Choudhury of 11KBW. This is an important judgment affecting the general approach to the public interest test in determining whether information under the EIR should be disclosed. The judgment is also relevant to the application of the public interest test under FOIA. The case concerned a request made to Ofcom (the regulatory body for radio communications) for the disclosure of information as to the location of mobile phone masts, and in particular for that information to be disclosed in a format that would enable the requester to manipulate the underlying data using data-handling applications. Ofcom resisted disclosure on the basis that it would prejudice (a) public safety (by identifying mast locations to criminals) and (b) the intellectual property rights of the Mobile Network Operators (such rights being the database rights in the information). The Information Tribunal considered that there was a strong public interest in disclosure given, amongst other matters, the benefit to epidemiological research as to the effects of mobile phone mast radiation on the health of the public. The Tribunal considered that it was entitled to take that public interest into account notwithstanding the fact that such research would be likely to involve an infringement of database rights. In addressing the public interest balance, the Tribunal took the then well-established course of separately weighing the public interest in maintaining each of the exceptions relied upon against the public interest in disclosure. It did not aggregate all the public interest factors against disclosure. The Tribunal found that the public interest balance favoured disclosure.

On the general point of principle, namely the approach to be taken in weighing the public interest in maintaining the exemption against the public interest in disclosure, the Court of Appeal disagreed with the Tribunal’s approach. The Court held that the public interest in maintaining each exemption should be aggregated and weighed against the public interest in disclosure. An exemption-by-exemption approach was still permissible provided that the matter is also looked at in the round at the end of the process by considering whether the aggregate public interest in maintaining the applicable exemptions outweighs the public interest in disclosure. However, the Court upheld the Tribunal’s’ approach in taking into account a factor as supporting the public interest in disclosure even where that factor involves a breach of third party intellectual property rights. The Court held that the legislative scheme is such that it is permissible to take such factors into account as an aspect of the public interest in disclosure. The matter was remitted to the Tribunal to reconsider the public interest balance in accordance with the approach laid down by the Court.

Government Vetoes Disclosure of Iraq Information

Posted on | by Anya Proops KC

Jack Straw has announced that he is exercising powers under section 53 FOIA to prevent minutes of Cabinet meetings held in the period leading up to the Iraq war from being disclosed under FOIA. The announcement, which was made to Parliament on 24 February 2009, follows in the wake of the Information Tribunal’s decision in January 2009 that the minutes should be disclosed. It is understood that this is the first time the Government has used the powers of veto under section 53. Jonathan Swift of 11 KBW acted on behalf of the Cabinet Office before the Tribunal. 11 KBW’s Timothy Pitt Payne acted for the Commissioner.

Section 53(2) FOIA:

‘A decision notice or enforcement notice to which this section applies shall cease to have effect if, not later than the twentieth working day following the effective date, the accountable person in relation to that authority gives the Commissioner a certificate signed by him stating that he has on reasonable grounds formed the opinion that, in respect of the request or requests concerned, there was no failure falling within subsection (1)(b)’

 Tribunal decision:

https://www.informationtribunal.gov.uk/DBFiles/Decision/i288/Cabinet%20Office%20v%20IC%20&%20C%20Lamb%20(EA-2008-0024,29)%20-%20Decision%2027-01-09.pdf

Media Reports:

https://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/feb/24/iraq-freedom-of-information

https://www.google.com/search?sourceid=navclient&ie=UTF-8&rlz=1T4GGLD_enGB311GB311&q=bbc+straw+cabinet

House of Lords Judgment in Sugar v BBC

Posted on | by Anya Proops KC

In Sugar v BBC  [2009] UKHL 9, the House of Lords has delivered an important judgment on the application of FOIA to so called ‘hybrid authorities’. The case concerned a request which was made by Mr Sugar in January 2005 for disclosure of a report which was held by the BBC and which concerned the BBC’s coverage of the Middle East. The BBC refused to release the report on the grounds that: (a) it was only subject to a duty to disclose information under section 1 FOIA to the extent that it was a ‘public authority’ for the purposes of that section; (b) part IV of schedule 1 to FOIA provides that the BBC is a ‘public authority’ only ‘in respect of information held for purposes other than those of journalism art or literature’; (c) the report was held for the purposes of journalism and, hence, the section 1 duty was not triggered in respect of the report. The Commissioner agreed with the BBC’s analysis. He went on to conclude that, because the BBC could not be treated a ‘public authority’ for the purposes of Mr Sugar’s request, he had no powers under section 50 FOIA to issue  a decision notice in respect of Mr Sugar’s complaint. On appeal by Mr Sugar to the Information Tribunal, the BBC and the Commissioner argued that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal as no decision notice had been issued under section 50. The Information Tribunal allowed Mr Sugar’s appeal against the Commissioner’s decision. It held that the Commissioner’s decision was a decision notice under section 50(3); that the BBC was a public authority for the purposes of section 1 FOIA and that the report was not held for the purposes of journalism. The BBC sought a judicial review of the Tribunal’s decision. That claim was upheld at first instance and on appeal to the Court of Appeal. Mr Sugar appealed to the House of Lords.

In a majority judgment (Lord Hoffman and Lady Hale dissenting), the House of Lords held that the Tribunal’s decision was sound in law. Importantly, the House of Lords found that the Commissioner had erred in concluding that Mr Sugar had not made a request under section 1 FOIA merely because the nature of the requested information. It found that, when dealing with ‘hybrid authorities’ such as the BBC (i.e. authorities which are only public authorities under FOIA for certain purposes), it would be impractical for the Commissioner to decide whether he had jurisdiction to consider a complaint simply by referring to the nature of the requested information. The correct approach would be for the Commissioner to treat hybrid authorities as always being ‘public authorities’ for the purposes of section 1, irrespective of the nature of the requested information. On this approach, the Commissioner would have jurisdiction to decide a complaint brought by the applicant, albeit that he would have to have regard to the provisions of schedule 1 as and when he was deciding whether the authority erred in refusing to disclose the requested information.  Notably, Lord Phillips commented on an obiter basis that, where information not falling within the scope of FOIA was requested by an applicant, a hybrid authority was lawfully entitled under FOIA to say to the applicant that it did not hold the requested information, even if in physical terms it did hold the requested information. Lord Phillips opined that this result was permitted by section 7 FOIA (para. 33).

In their dissenting judgments Lord Hoffmann and Lady Hale took a very different view of the matter. They concluded that schedule 1 FOIA defined the circumstances in which a body would be a ‘public authority’ for the purposes of section 1 and, in the case of the BBC, those circumstances did not include where the information was held for the purposes of journalism, art or literature; that the information requested by Mr Sugar was held for the purposes of journalism; that the BBC was accordingly not a ‘public authority’ under FOIA for the purposes of the request made by Mr Sugar; and, hence, that the Commissioner had been right to conclude that he had no jurisdiction in respect of Mr Sugar’s complaint. The Commissioner, who supported Mr Sugar’s case before the High Court and the Court of Appeal, was not a party to the appeal to the House Lords. 11KBW’s Ben Hooper represented the Commissioner in the High Court and the Court of Appeal.

The judgment:

https://www.bailii.org/cgi-bin/markup.cgi?doc=/uk/cases/UKHL/2009/9.html&query=title+(+sugar+)+and+title+(+v+)+and+title+(+british+)+and+title+(+broadcasting+)&method=boolean

BMA Expresses Concerns about New Data Sharing Powers

Posted on | by Anya Proops KC

The Coroners and Justice Bill was introduced in the House of Commons on 14 January 2009. Clause 152 of the Bill provides for the Data Protection Act 1998 to be amended to include a number of new provisions on data sharing. Those provisions include a section which creates a broad general power enabling any ‘designated authority’ to make an ‘information sharing order’, which is to say an order which enables ‘any person to share information which consists of or includes personal data’ (new section 50A(1)). The relevant designated authorities’ are ‘appropriate Ministers’ (i.e. Secretaries of State, the Treasury and Ministers in charge of government departments); Scottish Ministers; Welsh Ministers and a Northern Ireland Department (new section 50A(2)). Whilst these broad powers are subject to a number of limitations including those provided for under new sections 50C, 50A(4) and 50A(6), this has not prevented concerns being expressed as to the potential risks entailed upon these new provisions. Most recently, in an interview with the Guardian (14 February 2009), the British Medical Association’s Chairman, Hamish Meldrum, confirmed that he was ‘extremely concerned’ about these new data sharing powers, not least because they would potentially enable Ministers to allow patient data to be shared not merely within the NHS but also with other ministries and even private companies. Mr Meldrum said that the trust between doctors and patients would be destroyed if the Bill became law as it stands. The new powers embodied in clause 152 of the Coroners and Justice Bill follow in the wake of the development of another significant and controversial data sharing scheme under which the medical records of everyone in England are to be uploaded onto a national database, known as the Spine.

The Bill:

https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmbills/009/2009009.pdf

Guardian Articles:

https://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2009/feb/14/medical-records-nhs-privacy

https://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2008/sep/18/health.nhs

High Court Decision on Section 42 FOIA

Posted on | by Anya Proops KC

The High Court today handed down an important judgment on the application of the legal professional privilege exemption in section 42 FOIA ([2009] EWHC 164 (QB)). The case concerned an application for disclosure of information held by the DTI (subsequently the Department of Business and Regulatory Reform). The requested information related to the Government’s decision to include a provision in the Part Time Workers (Prevention of Less Favourable Treatment) Regulations 2000 which expressly excluded daily fee paid judicial office holders from the ambit of the Regulations. The request was made by Mr O’Brien QC, who himself sat as a daily fee paid judicial office holder. DBERR refused disclosure of the requested information on the basis that certain of the information was exempt under section 35 FOIA (policy information) whereas other information was exempt under section 42 (FOIA) (legally privileged information). Reliance was also placed on section 36 FOIA (prejudice to effective conduct of public affairs). The Commissioner rejected Mr O’Brien’s complaint about DBERR’s refusal decision, save that he did order that the content of one of the disputed documents be disclosed. The Tribunal upheld Mr O’Brien’s appeal against the Commissioner’s decision. It held that whilst the exemptions afforded under sections 35 and 42 were engaged in respect of the disputed information, on an application of the public interest test, the public interest weighed in favour of the information being disclosed (EA/2008/0011).

DBERR, which was named as an additional party before the Tribunal, appealed the decision to the High Court. The Commissioner participated in the appeal, not on the basis that he was formally supporting or resisting the appeal, but rather because: (a) he had some ‘concerns’ about the way in which the Tribunal had reached its conclusions in this case; and (b) he considered it important to draw the court’s attention to these concerns, not least because of the precedent-setting effect of the Tribunal’s decision. At the heart of the appeal before the High Court was the question whether the Tribunal had lawfully applied the section 2(2)(b) public interest test to the dipsuted information.

Wyn Williams J upheld the appeal in part. He found that the Tribunal’s application of the public interest test to information falling within the ambit of section 35 could not be impugned. However, he concluded that the Tribunal’s application of the public interest test to the information falling within the ambit of section 42 was fatally flawed. He reached this conclusion in particular on the basis that: (a) in accordance with a long line of Tribunal decisions starting with Bellamy v ICO, it was clear that there was a strong public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of legally privileged information which was effectively built into the section 42 exemption; and (b) the Tribunal’s reasons did not clearly demonstrate that it had taken this strong public interest into account when weighing the public interest balance. The importance of the judgment lies in the fact that it constitutes an authoritative judgment on how legally privileged information should be dealt with under FOIA.

The judgment is also significant in that: (1) it criticises the Tribunal for having failed to state clearly which of the disputed information fell within section 35 and which fell within section 42 (the Tribunal had simply found that the information fell within section 35 ‘and/or’ section 42); and (2) it confirms that, when dealing with the application of the public interest test where a number of exemptions are engaged, the Tribunal should ensure that it does not simply bundle all the public interest test considerations together but instead conducts discrete analyses of the public interests relevant to particular exemptions.