FOIA’s not all that: Kennedy v The Charity Commission [2014] UKSC 20

 

The Supreme Court’s much anticipated judgments in Kennedy v The Charity Commission make for a long read. But they are very important. All the parties in Kennedy were represented by Counsel from 11KBW: Andrew Sharland for Mr Kennedy; Karen Steyn and Rachel Kamm for the Charity Commission and the Secretary of State; Ben Hooper for the ICO; and Christopher Knight for the Media Legal Defence Initiative and Campaign for Freedom of Information.

The factual background is described in previous posts. In short the appeal concerned a FOIA request made by Mr Kennedy, a journalist at The Times, in June 2007, for disclosure of information concerning three inquiries conducted by the Charity Commission between 2003 and 2005 into the ‘Mariam Appeal’, which was launched by Mr George Galloway in connection with the sanctions imposed on Iraq following the first Gulf War. The Charity Commission relied on section 32(2) of FOIA in refusing the request. That provides an absolute exemption from disclosure where information held by a public authority is held only by virtue of being contained in either (a) any document placed in the custody of a person conducting an inquiry or arbitration, for the purposes of the inquiry or arbitration, or (b) any document created by a person conducting an inquiry or arbitration, for the purposes of the inquiry or arbitration. The Court of Appeal had held that this exemption applied to a request made in 2007 concerning inquiries which had finished in 2005.

The two primary questions for the Supreme Court were (1) whether the absolute exemption in section 32(2) continued after the end of an inquiry (so that Mr Kennedy was precluded from receiving the information); and (2) if so, what, if any difference Mr Kennedy’s rights under article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the “ECHR”) made to that result. In the result the Court’s discussion ranged more widely than may have been anticipated.

The majority of the Court agreed with the judgments of Lord Mance and Lord Toulson. (Lord Sumption gave a separate, concurring, judgment). The majority decided as follows.

(1) Section 32(2) continues to apply after the end of an inquiry

The Court held that the absolute exemption in section 32(2) FOIA does last beyond the end of an inquiry until the relevant information is destroyed or for up to 30 (or in future 20) years under the Public Records Act 1958. There were two principal reasons. First, that construction was supported by the words of the section themselves read as a whole. The words “for the purposes of the inquiry or arbitration” qualified the immediately preceding words in 32(2)(a) and (32)(2)(b) and referred to the original purpose for which the relevant documents were placed in the custody of, or were created by, a person conducting an inquiry. Secondly, the Court considered that its interpretation sat comfortably within FOIA as a whole.  Under section 62(1) FOIA, a record becomes a “historical record” at the end of 30 years, and, under section 63(1), information contained in a historical record cannot be exempt information because of section 32. Lords Mance and Toulson considered that, in that context, information falling within section 32 would continue to be exempt for 30 years instead of ceasing to be exempt at the end of an inquiry. That meant that, absent Mr Kennedy’s being able to demonstrate that Article 10 required a different result, he would not be entitled to the information he sought under FOIA itself.

(2) Article 10 ECHR did not lead to a different construction of section 32(2)

Mr Kennedy argued that if (as the Court held, above) he was not entitled to the information because of s.32(2), section 32(2) was incompatible with his rights under Article 10 ECHR, and that it should be ‘read down’ under the HRA (at the very least so as to mean that s.32(2) ceased to be an absolute exemption after the end of an inquiry).

There were two bases on which the Court decided that Article 10 did not, however, assist him.

The first was that there was no basis for concluding that section 32(2) was inconsistent with Article 10 in circumstances where s.32(2) put him in no less favourable a position than he was otherwise in under general statute and common law to access the information. That was because FOIA is not the only means through which information can be accessed. What section 32(2) of FOIA does is to take information falling within the absolute exemption outside the scope of that particular disclosure regime; but this does not mean that the information subject to the exemption could not otherwise be required to be disclosed by law.  Other statute, or the common law, might require disclosure, even though FOIA did not. According to the majority it could not be said that section 32(2) of FOIA was incompatible with the ECHR in those circumstances.

This is, plainly, a point of wider significance. It may be that the extent to which Article 10 may lack application because of the existence of equivalent rights of access under other statute or common law is likely to depend on the circumstances.

Both Lord Mance and Lord Toulson discussed rights of access to information in the specific context of Mr Kennedy’s request. In Lord Mance’s opinion, the Charity Commission had the power to disclose information to the public concerning inquiries on which it has published reports, both in pursuit of its statutory objective under the Charities Act 1993 (since replaced with the Charities Act 2011) of increasing public trust in, and the accountability of, charities, and under general common law duties of openness and transparency on public authorities. Lord Toulson placed greater emphasis on the fundamental principle of open justice forming part of the common law:

‘It has long been recognised that judicial processes should be open to public scrutiny unless and to the extent that there are valid countervailing reasons. This is the open justice principle. The reasons for it have been stated on many occasions. Letting in the light is the best way of keeping those responsible for exercising the judicial power of the state up to the mark and for maintaining public confidence’ (paragraph 110)

The exercise of the power of disclosure pursuant to the open justice principle would be subject to judicial review. Lord Mance considered that the courts should apply a high standard of review to any decision not to disclose information in answer to questions of real public interest raised by a journalist in relation to inquiries on which the Charity Commission has published reports (see e.g. paragraph 56).

The second reason why Mr Kennedy was not assisted by Article 10 according to the majority was that article 10 was not engaged because it does not impose a freestanding positive general duty of disclosure on public authorities. There is a particularly detailed discussion of the recent developments in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in the judgment of Lord Mance at paragraphs 57-100, which starts with the statement that the jurisprudence ‘is neither clear nor easy to reconcile’. Technically, the discussion is obiter, because, on the majority’s approach, it was unnecessary to decide the point for the resolution of the appeal. But it will remain, on the present state of the Strasbourg case law, difficult or impossible for requesters to rely on Article 10 as a means of arguing for a more favourable construction of FOIA.

Mr Kennedy’s appeal was, accordingly dismissed. His request under FOIA was properly refused in reliance on s.32(2) and Article 10 did not assist him.

Lord Wilson and Lord Carnwath, dissenting, would have allowed the appeal on the basis that Article 10 was engaged by Mr Kennedy’s FOIA request and should have led to s.32(2) being read down such that the absolute exemption expired at the end of the relevant inquiry.

My own view is that the greatest significance of Kennedy is its highlighting of the fact that FOIA is only one means of obtaining information from public authorities. If a different statutory or common law basis may be found for invoking a right in particular circumstances, a judicial review application may also be available. Whether that is a wise route for requesters to pursue, including given the costs implications of that form of litigation which do not apply in the same way in the tribunal, is a different question, but it is one to which fresh consideration might now be given in appropriate cases.

 

ICO cannot have a second go

Okay, the following points are mainly about procedure, but they are nonetheless quite important for those involved in FOIA litigation before the Tribunals. These points come from a pair of recent Upper Tribunal decisions, both arising out of requests from the same requester.

One is IC v Bell [2014] UKUT 0106 (AAC): Bell UT s58. Question: suppose the First-Tier Tribunal thinks the ICO got it wrong in its decision notice. Can it remit the matter to the ICO for him to think again and issue another decision notice on the same complaint? Answer: no, it can’t; it must dispose of the appeal itself. There are some exceptions, but that is the general view with which parties should approach Tribunal litigation.

That Bell decision also comments on the importance, in relevant circumstances, of the Tribunal ensuring that it gets the input of the public authority and not just of the ICO, as there will be cases where only the public authority can really provide the answers to questions that arise at the Tribunal stage.

That same Bell decision also explores this point, for those with an interest in FOIA and statutory construction (surely there are some of you?): under s. 58 of FOIA, unless the Tribunal is going to dismiss an appeal, it must “allow the appeal or substitute such other notice as could have been served by the Commissioner” (my emphasis). That is curious. Quite often, Tribunals do both of those things at the same time. What to make of this? Judge Jacobs explains in the Bell decision.

There was also a second Bell appeal on the same day: Bell UT s14. Same Bell, different public authority and separate case: IC and MOD v Bell (GIA/1384/2013). This was about s. 14 of FOIA (vexatious requests). The public authority had provided lots of detail about the background to the series of requests to make good its case under s. 14. But there was a paper hearing rather than an oral one and the Tribunal appears to have overlooked some of that detail and it found that s. 14 had been improperly applied.

Judge Jacobs overturned that decision. One reason was this: when a binding and decisive new judgment (here, Dransfield) appears between the date of a hearing and the date of the Tribunal’s final deliberations, justice requires that the parties be given an opportunity to make submissions on the application of that judgment.

Another was that the Tribunal had failed properly to engage with the documentary evidence before it. “That is why the papers were provided: to be read. A tribunal is not entitled to rely on the parties to point to the passages that it should read and to look at nothing else” (my emphasis). This underlined point is obviously of general application to Tribunal litigation.

Robin Hopkins @hopkinsrobin

Data protection and compensation: the “irreversible march” towards revolutionary change

At 11KBW’s Information Law conference this past Tuesday, I talked a bit about the progress of the draft EU Data Protection Regulation. I omitted to mention last week’s development (my reason: I was on holiday in Venice, where data protection seemed less pressing). In a plenary session on 12 March, the European Parliament voted overwhelmingly in support of the Commission’s current draft of the Regulation. This is all explain in this Memo from the European Commission. Here are some key points.

One is the apparently “irreversible” progress towards getting the Regulation onto the EU statute books. “The position of the Parliament is now set in stone and will not change even if the composition of the Parliament changes following the European elections in May. As a reminder, the remaining stage is for the European Council to agree to the proposal. Its ministers are meeting again in early June. So far, they have been broadly supportive.

Another point is about business size and data protection risk: SMEs will not need to notify (so where will the ICO get its funding?), they won’t need to have data protection officers or carry out privacy impact assessments as a default rule. “We want to make sure that obligations are not imposed except where they are necessary to protect personal data: the baker on the corner will not be subject to the same rules as a (multinational) data processing specialist.”

A third point has great consequences for international transfers: “Non-European companies, when offering services to European consumers, will have to apply the same rules and adhere to the same levels of protection of personal data. The reasoning is simple: if companies outside Europe want to take advantage of the European market with more than 500 million potential customers, then they have to play by the European rules”.

Fourth, the “right to be forgotten” is still very much on the agenda. “If an individual no longer wants his or her personal data to be processed or stored by a data controller, and if there is no legitimate reason for keeping it, the data should be removed from their system” (subject to freedom of expression). This “citizen in the driving seat” principle, like the consistency aim (the same rules applied the same away across the whole EU) and the “one-stop shop” regulatory model has been part of the reform package from the outset.

A final point is that the Parliament wants regulators to be able to impose big fines: “It has proposed strengthening the Commission’s proposal by making sure that fines can go up to 5% of the annual worldwide turnover of a company (up from 2% in the Commission’s proposal)”. Monetary penalties will not be mandatory, but they will potentially be huge.

On this last point about money: as under the current law, a regulatory fine is one thing and the individual’s right to be compensated another. At out seminar on Tuesday, we discussed whether there would soon be a sweeping away (see for example the Vidal-Hall v Google litigation) of the long-established Johnson v MDU principle that in order to be compensated for distress under section 13 of the DPA, you need first to prove that you suffered financial loss. That may well be so for the DPA, in which case the short- and medium-term consequences for data protection litigation in the UK will be huge.

But it is important to be clear about the longer term: this is going to happen anyway, regardless of any case-law development in UK jurisprudence. Article 77 of the current draft of the Regulation begins like this “Any person who has suffered damage, including non-pecuniary damage, as a result of an unlawful processing operation or of an action incompatible with this Regulation shall have the right to claim compensation from the controller or the processor for the damage suffered”.

If we are indeed irreversibly on track towards a new Regulation, then data protection litigation – notably, though not only about compensating data subjects – is guaranteed to be revolutionised.

Robin Hopkins @hopkinsrobin

A history and overview of the FOIA/EIR veto

The ‘veto’ (ministerial certificate) provision under s. 53 of FOIA (imported also into the EIRs) has been much discussed – on this blog and elsewhere – of late. Here is another excellent resource on the subject which is worth drawing to the attention of readers who want to understand this issue in more detail. Earlier this week, the House of Commons library published this note by Oonagh Gay and Ed Potton on the veto, its use to date, and comparative jurisdictions (Australia, New Zealand, Ireland).

Robin Hopkins @hopkinsrobin

Stop Press: Supreme Court to Hand Down Kennedy Judgment on Weds 26 March 2014

The Supreme Court has announced on its website that it will hand down judgment in the long-running saga of Kennedy v Charity Commission on Wednesday 26 March 2014. The judgment is expected to address the construction of section 32 FOIA and the extent to which Article 10 ECHR can be used to found a right of access to information. The judgment hand-down will be at 9.45 and can be watched live through the Supreme Court’s website.

Christopher Knight

Government security classifications to change on 2 April 2014

The government currently uses a scheme of ‘protective markings’ to classify the sensitivity of the information and documents it holds.  The protective markings are, in ascending order of security, protect; restricted; confidential; secret; top secret.  For further information see the HMG Security Policy Framework.

As of 2 April 2014 protective markings will be abolished and replaced by ‘security classifications’.  Those security classifications will be ‘official’, ‘secret’, and ‘top secret’.

For further information see the document Government Security Classifications and accompanying guidance.

Thomas Ogg