Personal data and fitness to practice investigations – Tribunal overturns ‘neither confirm nor deny’ position

January 17th, 2014 by Robin Hopkins

When an identifiable individual has been the subject of a formal complaint about their competence or conduct, that fact constitutes their personal data. In terms of privacy/publicity decisions, such situations are often approached in this way: where the complaint is well founded or at least merits serious consideration, publication is warranted, but otherwise confidentiality is maintained, lest unjustified aspersions be cast against that person.

In that respect, the process outlined by the Tribunal in Foster v IC (EA/2013/0176) – which concerned a complaint to the Nursing & Midwifery Council – is typical:

“The complaints procedure administered by the NMC has two stages. The first stage is designed to determine whether or not the matter should be referred to the NMC’s Fitness to Practice Panel. If it is, then the Panel will meet in public and its decision will be made publicly available. But if the complaint does not proceed beyond the first stage, (either because a decision is made not to investigate or because the NMC’s Investigating Committee Panel concludes that the complaint does not justify a reference to the Fitness to Practice Panel), then the process remains confidential. The rationale appears to be that an individual’s professional reputation should not be undermined by the publication of allegations that are found not to have sufficient merit to justify being referred to the Fitness to Practice Panel”.

The Appellant, whose son died following his participation in a drug trial, considered that the NMC investigation in this case – which did not pass the first stage – may have been inadequate. She asked for information about its investigation into her complaint about a named practitioner.

The NMC adopted a ‘neither confirm nor deny’ position under section 40(5), i.e. it considered that to say whether or not it held information on a complaint about this individual would be to tell the world at large whether or not that person had been the subject of a professional complaint of this description. The ICO agreed, but the Tribunal overturned that decision, ordering the NMC to confirm or deny whether it held the requested information.

In reaching that view, the Tribunal – while not passing judgment on the merits of the complaint or the NMC’s investigation – considered the criticisms that had been made:

“If it were to be the case that any member of the care team had realised the error earlier, but had not raised the alarm until after its very sad consequences had become clear, then there would seem to us to be strength in the Appellant’s argument that the evidential basis for the decision of the NMC’s Investigating Committee Panel required investigation”.

In those circumstances, the Tribunal thought the fairness balance favoured confirming or denying whether the requested information was held:

“In reaching that conclusion we reject the Information Commissioner’s argument that it is always unfair, and therefore in breach of the Data Protection Principles, to make a statement that discloses the existence of a complaint of professional misconduct against an individual, where there has been no finding of wrongdoing or malpractice. That would create an inflexible test which prevented all relevant circumstances being taken into account. Nor do we accept the Information Commissioner’s argument that the limited degree of disclosure involved in a “confirm or deny” response would constitute unwarranted interference into X’s privacy, without satisfying a legitimate public interest in disclosure”.

Public authorities who routinely adopt a default ‘neither confirm nor deny stance’ of the type outlined at the start of this post will wish to note that, at least in some circumstances, that approach can be called into question.

Robin Hopkins @hopkinsrobin

 

The Google/Safari users case: a potential revolution in DPA litigation?

January 16th, 2014 by Robin Hopkins

I posted earlier on Tugendhat J’s judgment this morning in Vidal-Hall and Others v Google Inc [2014] EWHC 13 (QB). The judgment is now available here – thanks as ever to Bailii.

This is what the case is about: a group of claimants say that, by tracking and collating information relating to their internet usage on the Apple Safari browser without their consent, Google (a) misused their private information (b) breached their confidences, and (c) breached its duties under the Data Protection Act 1998 – in particular, under the first, second, sixth and seventh data protection principles. They sought damages and injunctive relief.

As regards damages, “what they claim damages for is the damage they suffered by reason of the fact that the information collected from their devices was used to generate advertisements which were displayed on their screens. These were targeted to their apparent interests (as deduced from the information collected from the devices they used). The advertisements that they saw disclosed information about themselves. This was, or might have been, disclosed also to other persons who either had viewed, or might have viewed, these same advertisements on the screen of each Claimant’s device” (paragraph 24).

It is important to note that “what each of the Claimants claims in the present case is that they have suffered acute distress and anxiety. None of them claims any financial or special damage. And none of them claims that any third party, who may have had sight of the screen of a device used by them, in fact thereby discovered information about that Claimant which was detrimental” (paragraph 25).

The Claimants needed permission to serve proceedings on the US-based Google. They got permission and served their claim forms. Google then sought to have that service nullified, by seeking an order declaring that the English court has no jurisdiction to try these particular claims (i.e. it was not saying that it could never be sued in the English courts).

Tugendhat J disagreed – as things stand, the claims will now progress before the High Court (although Google says it intends to appeal).

Today’s judgment focused in part on construction of the CPR rules about service outside of this jurisdiction. I wanted to highlight some of the other points.

One of the issues was whether the breach of confidence and misuse of private information claims were “torts”. Tugendhat J said this of the approach: “Judges commonly adopt one or both of two approaches to resolving issues as to the meaning of a legal term, in this case the word “tort”. One approach is to look back to the history or evolution of the disputed term. The other is to look forward to the legislative purpose of the rule in which the disputed word appears”. Having looked to the history, he observed that “history does not determine identity. The fact that dogs evolved from wolves does not mean that dogs are wolves”.

The outcome (paragraphs 68-71): misuse of private information is a tort (and the oft-cited proposition that “the tort of invasion of privacy is unknown in English law” needs revisiting) but breach of confidence is not (given Kitetechnology BV v Unicor GmbH Plastmaschinen [1995] FSR 765).

Google also objected to the DPA claims being heard. This was partly because they were raised late; this objection was dismissed.

Google also said that, based on Johnson v MDU [2007] EWCA Civ 262; (2007) 96 BMLR 99, financial loss was required before damages under section 13 of the DPA could be awarded. Here, the Claimants alleged no financial loss. The Claimants argued against the Johnson proposition: they relied on Copland v UK 62617/00 [2007] ECHR 253, argued for a construction of the DPA that accords with Directive 95/46/EC as regards relief, and argued that – unlike in Johnson – this was a case in which their Article 8 ECHR rights were engaged. Tugendhat J has allowed this to proceed to trial, where it will be determined: “This is a controversial question of law in a developing area, and it is desirable that the facts should be found”.

If the Johnson approach is overturned – i.e. if the requirement for financial loss is dispensed with, at least for some types of DPA claim – then this could revolutionise data protection litigation in the UK. Claims under section 13 could be brought without claimants having suffered financially due to the alleged DPA breaches they have suffered.

Tugendhat went on to find that there were sufficiently serious issues to be tried here so as to justify service out of the jurisdiction – it could not be said that they were “not worth the candle”.

Further, there was an arguable case that the underlying information was, contrary to Google’s case, “private” and that it constituted “personal data” for DPA purposes (Google say the ‘identification’ limb of that definition is not met here).

Tugendhat was also satisfied that this jurisdiction was “clearly the appropriate one” (paragraph 134). He accepted the argument of Hugh Tomlinson QC (for the Claimants) that “in the world in which Google Inc operates, the location of documents is likely to be insignificant, since they are likely to be in electronic form, accessible from anywhere in the world”.

Subject to an appeal from Google, the claims will proceed in the UK. Allegations about Google’s conduct in other countries are unlikely to feature. Tugendhat J indicated a focus on what Google has done in the UK, to these individuals: “I think it very unlikely that a court would permit the Claimants in this case to adduce evidence of what Mr Tench refers to as alleged wrongdoing by Google Inc against other individuals, in particular given that it occurred in other parts of the world, governed by laws other than the law of England” (paragraph 47).

Robin Hopkins @hopkinsrobin

 

Personal data: Tribunal analyses the ‘relates to’ and ‘identification’ limbs

January 9th, 2014 by Robin Hopkins

I have commented in previous posts on how infrequently the Data Protection Act 1998 has been the subject of substantive litigation before the courts. One consequence of this is persistent uncertainty over how pivotal concepts such as ‘personal data’ are to be analysed and approached.

Last year, the High Court in Kelway v The Upper Tribunal, Northumbria Police and the Information Commissioner (2013) EWHC 2575 (Admin) considered how ‘personal data’ issues should be approached – see for example this piece by Cynthia O’Donoghue of Reed Smith.

The Kelway approach is rather complicated; it remains to be seen whether it is picked up as any sort of guiding test. The imminent Court of Appeal judgment in the Edem case is also likely to add to the picture on how to determine whether information is personal data.

As things stand, such determinations are not always straightforward. Oates v IC and DWP (EA/2013/0040) is a recent example at First-Tier Tribunal level. Mr Oates was medically examined by in connection with his incapacity benefit claim by a doctor engaged by Atos Healthcare. He was dissatisfied and complained to Atos. At the ‘independent tier’ of its complaint investigation, Atos engaged an independent medical practitioner and also an external company tasked with reviewing Atos’ handling of the initial complaint. Mr Oates wanted to know, inter alia, the names of the medical practitioner and of the company.

The DWP refused, relying on FOIA exemptions (section 40(2) and section 43(2)). The ICO decided that the withheld names should have been handled under the DPA rather than FOIA. This was because, in the ICO’s view, the withheld names constituted Mr Oates’ personal data –thus, by section 40(1) of FOIA, it was exempt under FOIA. Mr Oates had to seek it by a subject access request under the DPA instead.

The DWP said these names were not Mr Oates’ personal data. The Tribunal agreed. As to the ‘relates to’ limb of the definition of personal data, it applied Durant v FSA [2003] EWCA Civ 1746: it found there to be sufficient distance between the complaints review procedure and Mr Oates’ personal privacy to mean that the information did not ‘relate to’ him for DPA purposes.

As to the ‘identification’ limb of the definition of personal data, the DWP had argued that Mr Oates could not be identified from these names alone and that it was not in possession of information to link Mr Oates to the requested names. The ICO argued that the request itself provided that link. In other words, by asking for information about his own assessment and complaint, Mr Oates was providing the DWP with information which linked him to the requested names and allowed him to be identified as the person who had been assessed and who had complained.

Its argument was this: “at the moment when the DWP received the Request, it was put into possession of all the information it needed to relate the information requested to an identifiable individual, namely Mr Oates himself. The fact that he sought information about individuals who had been involved in the assessment of his particular complaint created the necessary connection between himself and the requested information – it both related to him and he could be identified from it.”

The Tribunal did not agree with that ‘linking’ argument. It said this:

“… we reject the Information Commissioner’s suggestion that we should take into account the Request itself. We are satisfied that the correct approach is to consider the body of relevant information held by the public authority in question immediately before the request was received. If that information can be seen to relate to the individual, and to identify him or her, then the case for characterising it as that individual’s personal data is made out. But if it does not do so then it is not appropriate, in our view, to close the circle by taking into account the additional information (as to the name of the individual who is both requester and data subject) which is set out in the request itself, in order to.”

Therefore, the ‘identification’ limb of the definition of personal data was not met either. The requested names did not comprise Mr Oates’ own personal data and fell to be dealt with under FOIA rather than through the subject access provisions of the DPA.

The decision in Oates raises a number of questions. For example, on ‘relates to’, the Durant principles are intended to offer guidance in ‘borderline’ cases – implicitly therefore, the Tribunal in Oates appears to have considered this to be a borderline situation.

On ‘identification’, the Tribunal did not mention the principle from Common Services Agency v Scottish Information Commissioner [2008] UKHL 47; [2011] 1 Info LR 184 that the ‘other information’ which can assist with identification of the individual encompasses not only information held by the data controller, but also information held by any person.

This is not to comment on whether the Tribunal reached the right decision or not – rather, it illustrates that the definition and limits of ‘personal data’ continues to raise tricky questions.

11KBW’s Tom Cross appeared for the ICO in Oates.

Robin Hopkins @hopkinsrobin

 

Legal analysis of individual’s situation is not their personal data, says Advocate General

December 18th, 2013 by Robin Hopkins

YS, M and S were three people who applied for lawful residence in the Netherlands. The latter two had their applications granted, but YS’ was refused. All three wanted to see a minute drafted by an official of the relevant authority in the Netherlands containing internal legal analysis on whether to grant them residence status. They made subject access requests under Dutch data protection law, the relevant provisions of which implement Article 12 of Directive 95/46/EC. They were given some of the contents of the minutes, but the legal analysis was withheld. This was challenged before the Dutch courts. Questions were referred to the CJEU on the application of data protection law to such information. In Joined Cases C‑141/12 and C‑372/12, Advocate General Sharpston has given her opinion, which the CJEU will consider before giving its judgment next year. Here are some important points from the AG’s opinion.

The definition of personal data

The minutes in question contained inter alia: the name, date of birth, nationality, sex, ethnicity, religion and language of the applicant; information about the procedural history; information about declarations made by the applicant and documents submitted; the applicable legal provisions and an assessment of the relevant information in the light of the applicable law.

Apart from the latter – the legal advice – the AG’s view is that this information does come within the meaning of personal data under the Directive. She said this:

“44. In general, ‘personal data’ is a broad concept. The Court has held that the term covers, for example, ‘the name of a person in conjunction with his telephone coordinates or information about his working conditions or hobbies’, his address, his daily work periods, rest periods and corresponding breaks and intervals, monies paid by certain bodies and the recipients, amounts of earned or unearned incomes and assets of natural persons.

45. The actual content of that information appears to be of no consequence as long as it relates to an identified or identifiable natural person. It can be understood to relate to any facts regarding that person’s private life and possibly, where relevant, his professional life (which might involve a more public aspect of that private life). It may be available in written form or be contained in, for example, a sound or image.”

The suggestion in the final paragraph is that the information need not have a substantial bearing on the individual’s privacy in order to constitute their personal data.

The AG also observed that “Directive 95/46 does not establish a right of access to any or every document or file in which personal data are listed or used” (paragraph 71). This resonates with the UK’s long-established Durant ‘notions of assistance’.

Legal analysis is not personal data

AG Sharpston’s view, however, was that the legal analysis of the individuals’ situations did not constitute their personal data. Her reasoning – complete with illustrative examples – is as follows:

“55. I am not convinced that the phrase ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person’ in Directive 95/46 should be read so widely as to cover all of the communicable content in which factual elements relating to a data subject are embedded.

56. In my opinion, only information relating to facts about an individual can be personal data. Except for the fact that it exists, a legal analysis is not such a fact. Thus, for example, a person’s address is personal data but an analysis of his domicile for legal purposes is not.

57. In that context, I do not find it helpful to distinguish between ‘objective’ facts and ‘subjective’ analysis. Facts can be expressed in different forms, some of which will result from assessing whatever is identifiable. For example, a person’s weight might be expressed objectively in kilos or in subjective terms such as ‘underweight’ or ‘obese’. Thus, I do not exclude the possibility that assessments and opinions may sometimes fall to be classified as data.

58. However, the steps of reasoning by which the conclusion is reached that a person is ‘underweight’ or ‘obese’ are not facts, any more than legal analysis is.”

Interestingly, her conclusion did touch upon the underlying connection between personal data and privacy. At paragraph 60, she observed that “… legal analysis as such does not fall within the sphere of an individual’s right to privacy. There is therefore no reason to assume that that individual is himself uniquely qualified to verify and rectify it and ask that it be erased or blocked. Rather, it is for an independent judicial authority to review the decision for which that legal analysis was prepared.”

In any event, legal analysis does not amount to “processing” for data protection purposes

The AG considered that legal analysis such as this was neither ‘automatic’ nor part of a ‘relevant filing system’. “Rather, it is a process controlled entirely by individual human intervention through which personal data (in so far as they are relevant to the legal analysis) are assessed, classified in legal terms and subjected to the application of the law, and by which a decision is taken on a question of law. Furthermore, that process is neither automatic nor directed at filing data” (paragraph 63).

Entitlement to data, but not in a set form

The AG also says that what matters is that individuals are provided with their data – data controllers are not, under the Directive, required to provide it in any particular form. For example, they can extract or transcribe rather than photocopy the relevant minute:

“74. Directive 95/46 does not require personal data covered by the right of access to be made available in the material form in which they exist or were initially recorded. In that regard, I consider that a Member State has a considerable margin of discretion to determine, based on the individual circumstances in case, the form in which to make personal data accessible.

75. In making that assessment, a Member State should take account of, in particular: (i) the material form(s) in which that information exists and can be made available to the data subject, (ii) the type of personal data and (iii) the objectives of the right of access.”

If the legal analysis is personal data, then the exemptions do not apply

Under the Directive, Article 12 provides the subject access right. Article 13 provides exemptions. The AG’s view was that if, contrary to her opinion, the legal analysis is found to be personal data, then exemptions from the duty to communicate that data would not be available. Of particular interest was her view concerning the exemption under Article 13(1)(g) for the “protection of the data subject or of the rights and freedoms of others”. Her view is that (paragraph 84):

“the protection of rights and freedoms of others (that is, other than the data subject) cannot be read as including rights and freedoms of the authority processing personal data. If a legal analysis is to be categorised as personal data, that must be because it is related to the private interests of an identified or identifiable person. Whilst the public interest in protecting internal advice in order to safeguard the administration’s ability to exercise its functions may indeed compete with the public interest in transparency, access to such advice cannot be restricted on the basis of the first of those two interests, because access covers only what falls within the private interest.”

If the Court agrees with the AG’s view, the case will be an important addition to case law offering guidance on the limits of personal data. It would also appear to limit, at least as regards the exemption outlined above, the data controller’s ability to rely on its own interests or on public interests to refuse subject access requests. That said, there is of course the exemption under Article 9 of the Directive for freedom of expression.

Robin Hopkins @hopkinsrobin

 

Damages under section 13 DPA: Court of Appeal’s judgment in Halliday

May 17th, 2013 by Robin Hopkins

I blogged a while ago about the ex tempore judgment from the Court of Appeal in a potentially groundbreaking case on damages under section 13 of the DPA, namely Halliday v Creation Consumer Finance [2013] EWCA Civ 333. The point of potential importance was that ‘nominal damages’ appeared to suffice for the purposes of section 13(1), thereby opening up section 13(2). In short, the point is that claimants under the DPA cannot be compensated for distress unless they have also suffered financial harm. A ‘nominal damages’ approach to the concept of financial harm threatened to make the DPA’s compensation regime dramatically more claimant-friendly.

The Court of Appeal’s full judgment is now available. As pointed out on Jon Baines’ blog, ground has not been broken: the ‘nominal damages’ point was a concession by the defendant rather than a determination by the Court. See paragraph 3 of the judgment of Lady Justice Arden:

“… this issue, which was the main issue of the proposed appeal to this court, is now academic as the respondent, CCF, concedes an award of nominal damages is “damage” for the purposes of the Directive and for the purposes of section 13(2) of the Data Protection Act 1998.”

Other potentially important points have also fallen somewhat flat. The question of whether UK law provided an adequate remedy for a breach of a right conferred by a European Directive fell away on the facts (“proof fell short in relation to the question of damage to reputation and credit”), while the provision for sanctions under Article 24 of Directive 95/46/EC was neither directly enforceable to Mr Halliday nor of assistance to him.

Still, the judgment is not without its notable points.

One is the recognition that compensation for harm suffered is a distinct matter from penalties for wrongdoing; the former is a matter for the courts in the DPA context, the latter a matter for the Information Commissioner and his monetary penalty powers. Such was the implication of paragraph 11:

“… it is not the function of the civil court, unless specifically provided for, to impose sanctions. That is done in other parts of the judicial system.”

Another point worth noting is Lady Justice Arden’s analysis of distress and the causation thereof. The distress must be caused by the breach, not by other factors such as (in this case) a failure to comply with a court order. See paragraph 20:

“Focusing on subsection (2), it is clear that the claimant has to be an individual, that he has to have suffered distress, and that the distress has to have been caused by contravention by a data controller of any of the requirements of the Act. In other words, this is a remedy which is not for distress at large but only for contravention of the data processing requirements. It also has to be distress suffered by the complainant and therefore would not include distress suffered by family members unless it was also suffered by him. When I say that it has to be caused by breach of the requirements of the Act, the distress which I accept Mr Halliday would have felt at the non-compliance of the order is not, at least directly, relevant because that is not distress by reason of the contravention by a data controller of the requirements of this Act. If the sole cause of the distress had been non-compliance with a court order, then that would have lain outside the Act unless it could be shown that it was in substance about the non-compliance with the Data Protection Act.”

The claimant had sought to draw an analogy with guidelines and banding for discrimination awards as set by Vento v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2013] 1 ICR 31. The Court of Appeal was not attracted. See paragraph 26:

“In answer to that point, the field of discrimination is, it seems to me, not a helpful guide for the purposes of data protection. Discrimination is generally accompanied by loss of equality of opportunity with far-reaching effects and is liable to cause distinct and well-known distress to the complainant.”

Finally, Lady Justice Arden commented as follows concerning the level of the compensation to be awarded on the facts of this case: “in my judgment the sum to be awarded should be of a relatively modest nature since it is not the intention of the legislation to produce some kind of substantial award. It is intended to be compensation, and thus I would consider it sufficient to render an award in the sum of £750” (paragraph 36).

Lord Justice Lloyd (who, along with Mr Justice Ryder agreed with Lady Justice Arden) did pause to think about a submission on this question ‘if you were so distressed, why did you not complain immediately?’, but concluded that (paragraph 47):

“I confess that I was somewhat impressed at one point by Mr Capon’s submission that it was a surprise, if Mr Halliday was so distressed by this contravention, that he did not immediately protest upon discovering, in response to his first credit reference enquiry, the fact of the contravention, and indeed he did not protest until about a month after the second report had been obtained. But I bear in mind, in response to that, Mr Halliday’s comment that he had had such difficulty in getting any sensible response, or indeed any response, out of CCF at the earlier stage, that it is perhaps less surprising that he did not immediately protest. In any event, the period in question is not a very lengthy one between his discovery of the contravention by his first reference request and his taking action in July. Accordingly, it does not seem to me that that is a matter that should be taken to reduce my assessment of the degree of distress that he suffered.”

Robin Hopkins

 

Data protection: trends, possibilities and FOI disclosures

April 29th, 2013 by Robin Hopkins

At 11KBW’s information law seminar in May, one of the discussion topics was ‘the future of data protection’. Here are some further thoughts on some interesting trends and developments.

Progress at the EU level

A major issue on this front is of course progress on the draft EU Data Protection Regulation – on which see this blog post from the ICO’s David Smith for an overview of the issues currently attracting the most debate. While that negotiation process runs its course, the Article 29 Working Party continues to provide influential guidance for users and regulators on some of the thorniest data protection issues. Its most recent opinion addresses purpose limitation, i.e. the circumstances under which data obtained for one purpose can be put to another. A summary of its views is available here.

Subject access requests

Turning to domestic DPA litigation in the UK, practitioners should watch out for a number of other developments (actual or potential) over the coming months. On the subject access request front, for example, data controllers have tended to take comfort from two themes in recent judgments (such as Elliott and Abadir, both reported on Panopticon). In short, the courts in those cases have agreed that (i) data controllers need only carry out reasonable and proportionate searches, and (ii) that section 7(9) claims being pursued for the collateral purpose of aiding other substantive litigation will be an abuse of process.

Data controllers should, however, note that neither of those points is free from doubt: there are plenty who doubt the legal soundness of the proportionality point, and the abuse of process point has arisen for section 7(9) claims to the court – it should not, in other words, be relied upon too readily to refuse requests themselves.

Damages

Damages under section 13 of the DPA is another area of potentially important change. The Halliday v Creation Consumer Finance case (briefly reported by Panopticon) has been given further discussion in the Criminal Law & Justice Weekly here. Based on that information, perhaps the most interesting point is this: defendants have rightly taken comfort from the requirement under section 13 that compensation for distress can be awarded only where damage has also been suffered. In Halliday, however, nominal damages (of £1) were awarded, thereby apparently fulfilling the ‘damage’ requirement and opening the door for a ‘distress’ award (though note that Panopticon has not yet seen a full judgment from the Court of Appeal in this case, so do not take this as a definitive account). If that approach becomes standard practice, claimants may be in much stronger positions for seeking damages.

A further potential development on the damages front arises out of monetary penalty notices: data controllers who are subject to hefty penalties by the ICO may in some cases also find themselves facing section 13 claims from the affected data subjects themselves, presenting a worrying prospect of paying out twice for the same mistake.

Disclosure of personal data in the FOIA context

In general terms, requesters struggle to obtain the personal data of others through FOIA requests. A couple of very recent decisions have, however, gone the other way.

In White v IC and Carmarthenshire County Council (EA/2012/0238), the First-Tier Tribunal allowed the requester’s appeal and ordered disclosure of a list of licensed dog-breeders in the council’s area. In particular, it concluded that (paragraphs 21-23):

“…the Tribunal believes – on the facts of this case – that an important factor for any assessment in relation to the “fairness” of the disclosure of the personal data is best discovered from the context in which the personal data was provided to the Council in the first place.

22. The context, here, is to secure a commercial licence required by law to breed dogs. That license is necessary for the local authority to know who the licensed dog breeders in that area are, and so that the law can be enforced and welfare checks can be conducted as and when necessary in relation to the welfare of the dogs being bred commercially.

23. Licensing – in the ordinary course of things – is a public regulatory process. Indeed it was a public process in Carmarthenshire, in relation to the information that is at the core of this appeal, until the Council changed its policy in 2008.”

The Tribunal was unimpressed by the suggestive language of a survey of dog breeders which the council had carried out to support its case for non-disclosure. It also noted that a neighbouring council had disclosed such information.

The First-Tier Tribunal issued its decision in Dicker v IC (EA/2012/0250) today. It allowed the requester’s appeal and ordered disclosure of the salary of the chief executive of the NHS Surrey PCT over specified time periods, including total remuneration, expenses allowance, pension contributions and benefit details. As to legitimate interests in disclosure, the Tribunal said that (paragraph 13):

“In this case the arrangements (including secondment and recharge from another public authority at one stage) mean that the arrangements are not as transparent as might be wished and it is not entirely clear from the information published (as opposed to the assurances given) that the national pay guidance has been complied with. Mr Dicker asserted that the CEO was paid in excess of the national framework. The Tribunal was satisfied that there was a legitimate public interest in demonstrating that the national framework had been complied with and that the published information did not properly establish this”.

On the questions of distress and privacy infringements, the Tribunal took this view (paragraph 14):

“The CEO is a prominent public servant discharging heavy responsibilities who must expect to be scrutinised. Individuals in such circumstances are rational, efficient, hard-working and robust. They are fully entitled to a high degree of respect for their private lives. However the protection of personal information about their families and their health is a very different matter from having in the public domain information about income… The Tribunal simply cannot accept that anyone in such a role would feel the slightest distress, or consider that there has been any intrusion or that they would be prejudiced in any way by such information. From the perspective of the individual such information is essentially trivial; indeed, in other European societies, such information would be routinely available.”

If this approach were to become standard, the implications for public authorities would be significant.

Further, there are two very important personal data FOIA cases to look out for in the coming months. Following its decision in the Edem case late in 2012, the Upper Tribunal’s next consideration of personal data in the FOIA context is the appeal in the Morley v IC & Surrey Heath Borough Council (EA/2011/0173) case, in which the Tribunal – in a majority decision in which Facebook disclosures played a significant part – ordered the disclosure of names of certain youth councillors.

More importantly, the Supreme Court will hear an appeal from the Scottish Court of Session in July about a FOISA request for the number of individuals employed by the Council on specific points in the pay structure. The council relied on the personal data exemption (contending that individuals could be identified from the requested information), but the Scottish Information Commissioner ordered disclosure and succeeded before Scotland’s highest court. The Supreme Court will consider issues including the approach to ‘legitimate interests’ under condition 6(1) of schedule 2 to the DPA (the condition most often relied upon in support of disclosing personal data to the public). The case is likely to have far-reaching implications. For more detail, see Alistair Sloan’s blog.

Panopticon will, as ever, keep its eye on these and other related developments.

Robin Hopkins