CHILLING EFFECT, SAFE SPACE AND THE NHS RISK REGISTERS

In a recent post, Panopticon brought you, hot-off-the-press, the Tribunal’s decision in the much-publicised case of Department of Health v IC, Healey and Cecil (EA/2011/0286 & EA/2011/0287). Somewhat less hot-off-the-press are my observations. This is a very important decision, both for its engagement with the legislative process and for its analysis of the public interest with respect to section 35(1)(a) of FOIA (formulation or development of government policy) – particularly the “chilling effect” argument. At the outset, it is important to be clear about what was being requested and when.

Risk registers in general

The DOH prepared two “risk registers” documenting the risks associated with implementing the “far-reaching and highly controversial” NHS reforms under what was then the Health and Social Care Bill. The Tribunal heard that risk registers are used widely across government for project planning. They provide snapshots (rather than detailed discussions) combining the probability of and outcomes from any given risk associated with the proposed reform; risks are then classified in red, amber or green terms. According to Lord Gus O’Donnell, who gave evidence in support of the DOH’s case, risk registers are the most important tool used across government to formulate and develop policy for risk management in advising ministers. John Healey MP, one of the requesters in this case, said that he was a minister for ten years and was never shown such a register.

The requests and these particular registers

On 29 November 2010, Mr Healey requested a copy of the “Transition Risk Register” (TRR). This, the Tribunal found, was largely concerned with operational matters; it aimed to identify implementation risks. By this stage, the government had already published its White Paper on the reforms. Crucially, the Tribunal’s finding was that the broad policy decision had been taken by the time of the White Paper. The subsequent consultation was largely directed at how best to implement the White Paper. In response to that consultation, the government adhered to the vast majority of its plans, and set about implementing them early where possible.

On 28 February 2011, the second requester, Nicholas Cecil, asked for a copy of the Strategic Risk Register (“SRR”). This was concerned with potential policy decisions for ministers. By that time, the Bill had been laid before Parliament. Parliament’s reaction meant that, in a number of respects, ministers were called upon to rethink policy decisions surrounding the NHS reforms.

Both requests were refused. The IC ordered that they be disclosed. The Tribunal upheld the IC’s decision on the TRR, but allowed the DOH’s appeal on the SRR.

The approach to section 35(1)(a) of FOIA

Before the Tribunal, it was accepted that this exemption was engaged with respect to both registers. The Tribunal considered that the need for a safe space for policy-making was not linear. Its analysis is worth quoting in detail:

“We are prepared to accept that there is no straight line between formulation and development and delivery and implementation. We consider that during the progress of a government introducing a new policy that the need for a safe space will change during the course of a Bill. For example while policy is being formulated at a time of intensive consultation during the initial period when policy is formed and finalised the need for a safe space will be at its highest. Once the policy is announced this need will diminish but while the policy is being debated in Parliament it may be necessary for the government to further develop the policy, and even undertake further public consultation, before the Bill reflects the government’s final position on the new policy as it receives the Royal Assent. Therefore there may be a need to, in effect, dip in and out of the safe space during this passage of time so government can continue to consider its options. There may also come a time in the life of an Act of Parliament when the policy is reconsidered and a safe space is again needed. Such a need for policy review and development may arise from implementation issues which in themselves require Ministers to make decisions giving rise to policy formulation and development. We therefore understand why the UCL report describes the process as a “continuous circle” certainly until a Bill receives the Royal Assent. However the need for safe spaces during this process depends on the facts and circumstances in each case. Critically the strength of the public interest for maintaining the exemption depends on the public interest balance at the time the safe space is being required.

We would also observe that where a Bill is a Framework Bill we can understand that even after it receives the Royal Assent there will be a need for safe spaces for policy formulation as secondary legislation is developed. We note in this case that the Bill, although suggested by DOH to be a Framework Bill, is prescriptive of economic regulation, and cannot be described purely in framework terms.”

Public interest factors in favour of maintaining the exemption: safe space and chilling effect

One of the DOH’s witnesses contended that the registers allowed a safe space for officials to “think the unthinkable”, but the Tribunal found it difficult to see how the registers – particularly the TRR – could be described in that way: “the TRR identifies the sorts of risks one would expect to see in such a register from a competent Department”. Nonetheless, the Tribunal accepted the strong public interest in there being a safe space for policy formulation.

The main argument concerned the chilling effect, which Lord O’Donnell addressed in his evidence. The Tribunal considered that there was no actual evidence of the chilling effect following other instances of comparable disclosures (e.g. following OGC v IC (EA/2006/2068 & 80), or following a 2008 disclosure of a risk register concerning a third runway at Heathrow). Similarly, a 2010 report from UCL’s Constitution Unit concluded there to be little evidence for the chilling effect.

Overall, the Tribunal cautioned against treating qualified exemptions as absolute ones. It said:

“We would observe that the DOH’s position expressed in evidence is tantamount to saying that there should be an absolute exemption for risk registers at the stages the registers were requested in this case. Parliament has not so provided. S.35 (and s.36) are qualified exemptions subject to a public interest test, which means that there is no absolute guarantee that information will not be disclosed, however strong the public interest in maintaining the exemption.”

Factors in favour of disclosure

The DOH’s witnesses sought to play down the significance of the NHS reforms in comparison to other important reforms implemented by government. Mr Healey, however, argued that they were exceptional. The Tribunal agreed with him.

It also noted that the Conservatives’ manifesto for the 2010 election had promised an end to top-down NHS reorganisation, but that its NHS White Paper then appeared to propose exactly such a reorganisation. It was not preceded by a Green Paper. It was clear to the Tribunal that the White Paper was published in a hurry and to much public concern. Given the scale and controversial nature of the reforms, transparency of decision-making was very important.

The Tribunal found the public interest balance to be very difficult in this case. Judging the matters at the time of the DOH’s refusal notices, the Tribunal concluded that the balance favoured disclosure of the TRR but not the SRR – due to the differences in the nature of the registers and the timing of the requests (see above).

Section 40(2) of FOIA and civil servants’ names

Finally, the Tribunal also considered the DOH’s reliance on section 40(2) to redact the names of a number of civil servants on the grounds of their being insufficiently senior for disclosure to be fair. The Tribunal ordered the disclosure of the majority of these names. In so doing, it focused on the substance of what each individual did with respect to this particular information – rather than on their Civil Service grades.

Robin Hopkins

EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION: NEW APPGER DECISION ON SS. 23, 27, NCND AND OTHERS

I blogged yesterday (see below) on APPGER’s litigation in the US courts concerning information about security bodies and their role in extraordinary rendition. The UK’s First-Tier Tribunal has today promulgated its decision on a separate set of requests made by APPGER to the Foreign & Commonwealth Office. The decision deals primarily with sections 23, 27, 35, 42 and the ‘neither confirm nor deny’ provisions under sections 23(5) and 24(2) of FOIA.

One of my fellow Panopticonners will post some commentary on the case shortly. In the mean time, here is the hot-off-the-press decision:

20120412_APPGER_decision

SECURITY BODIES, PRIVATE EMAILS – PARALLELS BETWEEN THE UK & US

Today was one of striking parallels between the USA and the UK in terms of litigation concerned with access to information.

APPGER and security bodies

First, one of The Independent‘s main stories this morning concerned a case brought in the US by the UK’s All Party Parliamentary Group on Extraordinary Rendition (APPGER). Readers will recall that in the UK, APPGER was partially successful before the Upper Tribunal last year; the decision of the First-Tier Tribunal in a second case (the hearing of which concluded in February 2012) is awaited.

In the US, APPGER requested information on extraordinary rendition from the Department of Defense, the CIA, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice , the Department of State, the FBI and the National Security Agency. Those requests were largely refused. APPGER appealed to the Courts. The US District Court, District of Columbia, upheld the Defendants’ partial motion to dismiss APPGER’s appeals. Its judgment is available here.

Prior to 2002, the exemptions under FOIA in the US turned on the nature of the requested information, not the identity of the requester. In 2002, however, Congress amended FOIA to include a “foreign government entity exemption”, which provides that no agency that is a member of the “intelligence community” shall make any record available to “(i) any government entity, other than a State, territory, commonwealth, or district of the United States, or any subdivision thereof; or (ii) a representative of a government entity described in clause (i).”

The Court held that APPGER fell within this exemption. It construed the terms “government entity” and “representative” according to their “plain meaning” and not according to UK law. On this basis, it found (contrary to APPGER’s arguments) that the UK Parliament is a “government entity”: it is the “primary organ tasked with the expression of sovereign political authority and its enactment into law” and is integral to the government of the UK. APPGER was held to be a “subdivision” of Parliament, and its chair, Andrew Tyrie MP (who has never been a government minister) was held to be a “representative” for the purposes of part (ii) of the exemption.

APPGER had also argued that its members had made their requests in their capacities as individuals rather than public officials. The Court rejected this argument in striking terms:

“It would be particularly inappropriate for the court to adopt the plaintiffs’ suggestion because their proposed exception would, without doubt, swallow the rule. The defendants describe the portentous consequences of the plaintiffs’ argument if drawn to its logical extreme: recently deceased North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il, despite his status as the Supreme Leader of the Democratic People’s Republic of North Korea, would have been able to file a FOIA request as long as he claimed to do so in his “individual capacity.”… It is not necessary to follow the defendants’ parade of horribles to its furthest reaches, however. Instead, the court observes that a statute susceptible of either of two opposed interpretations must be read in the manner which effectuates rather than frustrates the major purpose of the legislative draftsmen…. If the court is to give any meaning to the foreign government entity exception, this provision cannot turn on such evanescent factors as the subjective intent of the individual who files the claim. To do so would essentially allow a system of voluntary compliance — which is to say, no compliance at all. Accordingly, the court rejects the contention that the plaintiffs may evade the foreign government entity exception by filing in their “individual capacity.”

The Kim Jong Il point aside, the above passage is notable for its contrasts with axioms of FOIA in the UK: in the US, FOIA is motive blind, but no longer applicant blind.

Private email accounts

In the second of today’s US cases (thanks to the BBC’s Martin Rosenbaum for alerting me to this one), the San Antonio Express-News made a request under the Texas Public Information Act for emails concerned with public business sent to and from the private email account of the Bexar County Commissioner, Tommy Adkisson. Rather like the UK’s Information Commissioner in his Department for Education decision, the Texas Attorney General took the view that these emails should be disclosed. A District Judge in Austin has dismissed Mr Adkisson’s case and upheld the Attorney General’s position (though an appeal seems likely). Time will tell whether the UK Tribunal takes a similar view of the Department for Education’s appeal concerning private email accounts.

Robin Hopkins

Article 10 and Access to Information (again…) – the view from the Grand Chamber

Loyal readers know that the past 18 months have seen a succession of cases address whether Article 10 of the ECHR (the right to freedom of expression) comprehends a right of access to information held by public bodies.

As previously blogged by Julian Milford, in Sugar v BBC the UK Supreme Court (per Lord Brown, in his own inimitable style…) gave the argument that Article 10 could confer a right of access to information exceedingly short shrift. The Court of Appeal in Kennedy v Charity Commission [2012] EWCA Civ 317 (blogged by Anya Proops) then handed down a judgment that, notwithstanding the CoA’s somewhat quixotic decision to grant permission to appeal, appeared to signal that in Sugar the Article 10 ‘access to information’ argument had been given its quietus.

However, the plot simply continues to thicken as the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR has just handed down a judgment – Gillberg v Sweden, Application no. 41723/06, 3 April 2012 – which (while far from a model of clarity) appears to endorse the proposition that Article 10 can (in certain circumstances, the scope of which are almost entirely unclear) confer a right of access documents held by public bodies. The crucial paragraph of the Grand Chamber’s judgment is at [93] where it is stated that:

“…In the Court’s view, finding that the applicant had such a right under Article 10 of the Convention would run counter to the property rights of the University of Gothenburg. It would also impinge on K’s and E’s rights under Article 10, as granted by the Administrative Court of Appeal, to receive information in the form of access to the public documents concerned, and on their rights under Article 6 to have the final judgments of the Administrative Court of Appeal implemented (see, mutatis mutandis, Loiseau v. France (dec.) no. 46809/99, ECHR 2003-XII, extracts; Burdov v. Russia, no. 59498/00, § 34, ECHR 2002-III; and Hornsby v. Greece, judgment of 19 March 1997, § 40, Reports 1997-II).”

It should be noted immediately that: (i) the issue as to whether Article 10 connotes a right of access to documents was very much peripheral to the case, and so the Grand Chamber’s observation is very much obiter dictum (or the Strasbourgian (sic) equivalent); (ii) the passage does not cite the recent Strasbourg case law said to support the proposition that Article 10 confers a right of access to information e.g. Tarsasag v Hungary etc; and (iii) the critical part of the passage appears premised on the assumption that the content of the ‘Article 10 right’ of access to documents is defined by Swedish domestic law (rather than enjoying an autonomous ambit as defined by the ECHR itself).

However, notwithstanding these important caveats, this does appear to be the first occasion on which the Grand Chamber has endorsed the proposition that Article 10 (at least in some circumstances) is capable of conferring a right of access to documents held by public bodies. Could this prompt the UK Supreme Court in Kennedy to reappraise the stance towards the ambit of Article 10 advocated by Lord Brown in Sugar ? Watch this space.

Joe Barrett

TRIBUNAL’S DECISION IN DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH RISK REGISTER CASE

The First-Tier Tribunal’s decision in Department of Health v IC, John Healey MP and Nicholas Cecil (EA/2011/0286 & 287) played a central role in the highly-charged political debates about the Health and Social Care Act. The Tribunal dismissed the Department’s appeal in part, but was unable to give written reasons before the Act entered the statute books. The Tribunal’s written reasons have now been promulgated and are available here:

2012_04_05; DOH v IC Healey final decision

Panopticon analysis will follow, but we thought some of our readers would like a hot-off-the-press look at the decision in the interim.

Robin Hopkins

INTERNET SURVEILLANCE – A SNOOPER’S CHARTER?

In 2004, the former Information Commissioner, Richard Thomas, commenting on the then Labour Government’s proposed ID card scheme, warned us to take care that we do not ‘sleepwalk into a surveillance society’. That warning appears to have particular resonance this week following announcements by the Coalition Government of plans to extend current surveillance legislation so as to allow for the instantaneous tracking of internet usage by individuals within the UK. The plans would reportedly allow GCHQ to access all internet traffic (including information about webmails, web-browsing, internet calls and social networking activities) in real-time and on demand. Whilst the detail of the plans remains decidedly obscure, some media reports suggest that they are directed not only at capturing new technological modes of communication but also at loosening current restrictions on accessing tracking information so that, for example, warrants would not have to be sought in individual cases. The Government, which appears to be facing a huge backlash over the proposals, has indicated that current laws need to be updated so as to capture modern modes of communication which are not (or not adequately) caught by the existing regime, e.g. Skype calls and Facebook messaging. It has also suggested that rights of access under the new legislation would be limited to tracking information (e.g. who sent an email to whom, when and from where) and would not embrace any automatic right of access to the substantive content of the communication. However, critics have been swift to point out the potential threat to civil liberties posed by the plans, not to mention the inevitable risk of function creep. They highlight the dangers of a system which potentially draws, not only criminals and those posing a danger to our society into the snooping net, but potentially all innocent law abiding citizens as well. In an effort to defuse the current controversy, the Deputy Prime Minister has now promised  that open Parliamentary hearings would be held to examine draft clauses of any new bill based on the plans. However, it remains to be seen how the Government will seek to reconcile any draft bill with both the restrictions on the processing of personal data embodied in the existing 1995 Data Protection Directive the right to privacy afforded under Article 8 ECHR. It is of course inevitable that, as technology advances, so too will State surveillance systems need to evolve. However, the critical question is whether those systems can effectively be crafted so as to ensure that the surveillance society is kept within proper bounds.