Tag: safe space

George Osborne, Nigel Lawson and FOIA – political vs official information

Posted on | by Robin Hopkins

Government ministers wear two hats (apart from Vince Cable – he seems to like hats, and probably has quite a few). They are public officials, but they are also party politicians. Both of those activities are likely to generate recorded information. FOIA extends to the official information, but not the party political. This is well established in principle, but not straightforward to apply, since the two categories will often overlap. It is also surprisingly untested before Tribunals. Michael Gove was due to test the principle in a 2012 appeal, but that was withdrawn.

The issue has now been considered by the Tribunal in Brendan Montague v IC and HM Treasury (EA/2013/0074): 029 070114 Final Decision EA-2013-0074. The information in dispute was a record of a telephone conversation which took place on a Sunday morning in September 2011 between the Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, and one of his predecessors, Lord Lawson.

The ICO’s position (and that of HMT) was that some of that information was predominantly party political in nature and was thus not held by HM Treasury for FOIA purposes. The remainder was exempt under section 35(1)(a), i.e. insofar as official business was being discussed, it related to the formulation or development of government policy, and the public interest favoured maintaining the exemption.

The Tribunal disagreed on the first point: while it accepted the principle, it had “no hesitation” in concluding that all of the disputed information in this case was held by HMT for official purposes rather than Mr Osborne’s party-political ones. It was not attracted by dissecting and partitioning the record between the party-political and the official in this instance, and it favoured a restrictive approach to a principle by which information could be taken outside of FOIA’s reach.

On the section 35(1)(a) point, the Tribunal agreed that there was a need for a safe space, given the high-level economic policy issues – including concerning the banking sector – which were being discussed. It was satisfied that the disputed information did not indicate that any impropriety or lobbying was at play.

I appeared for the ICO; my colleague Julian Milford appeared for HMT. No further analysis from me, given my involvement in the case, but I post it here because of the relative novelty of the political/official information point which, one suspects, will rear its head in other cases in future.

Robin Hopkins @hopkinsrobin

Legal advice on Scottish independence: date set for appeal

Posted on | by Robin Hopkins

In a decision notice of 6 July 2012, the Scottish Information Commissioner, Rosemary Agnew, ordered the Scottish Ministers to confirm or deny whether they had taken legal advice on the status of Scotland within the European Union should Scotland choose to break away from the UK. In essence, the underlying issue is whether or not an independent Scotland would retain EU membership or whether it would need to apply afresh. The Scottish Ministers have appealed against that decision, arguing that they were entitled under the Freedom of Information (Scotland) Act 2002 to refuse to confirm or deny whether they had taken such advice. The appeal is being fast-tracked, and has been listed for 18-19 December. In the meantime, here is Panopticon’s synopsis of the issues in the decision notice.

First, it is important to note how the ‘neither confirm nor deny’ (NCND) provision under s. 18 of FOISA works. Public authorities are entitled to issue a NCND response if the underlying informationm if held, would be exempt from disclosure (due to the balance of interest in maintaining a qualified exemption) and if the public interest in neither confirming or denying whether such information is held outweighs that in confirmation or denial.

The Scottish IC agreed with the Scottish Ministers on the first limb – but not the second.

The first qualified exemption relied on was s. 29(1)(a) FOISA (formulation or development of government policy. The Commissioner took the view “that “formulation” of government policy suggests the early stages of the policy process where options are identified and considered, risks are identified, consultation takes place and recommendations and submissions are presented to the Ministers. “Development” suggests the processes involved in reviewing, improving upon or amending existing policy; it can involve piloting, monitoring, analysing, reviewing or recording the effects of existing policy” (paragraph 15). The Commissioner accepted that this exemption was engaged would be engaged with respect to the underlying legal advice (if any were held). She rejected the requester’s argument that policy (here: achieving independence for Scotland) is one thing, but advice on the legal effects of that policy (here: EU membership) was a different and separate matter.

The second qualified exemption relied on was s. 30(c), which applies “would otherwise prejudice substantially, or be likely to prejudice substantially, the effective conduct of public affairs”. The Commissioner said (paragraph 22): “This is a broad exemption and the Commissioner expects any public authority citing it to show what specific harm would be caused to the conduct of public affairs by release of the information, and how that harm would be expected to follow from release.”

Again, she was satisfied that the exemption would be engaged. See paragraph 26: “The Commissioner accepts the Ministers’ arguments that disclosure of any such advice at this stage could be obstructive to future dialogue and negotiations with other parties and stakeholders concerning a matter of sensitivity, importance and significance.”

The requester argued that, if such legal advice was held, one could scarcely think of information in which there was a stronger public interest in disclosure. In contrast, the Ministers advanced arguments based on the need for a safe space, the risk of a chilling effect on communications, and the risk that disclosure of such information at the time of the request would create substantially misleading impressions. The Commissioner agreed that these factors were significant and that, if such information were held, the public interest would favour the maintenance of the exemptions. She added that “… in September 2011, the independence referendum was still some years away. In her view, the urgency of the need to understand the consequences of any legal advice obtained by the Ministers would be considerably less at that time (or even now) than it would be as the referendum approached” (paragraph 44).

That, however, only got the Ministers part of the way to an NCND position. The Commissioner found that the public interest favoured confirming or denying whether the Ministers had taken legal advice on this issue. At paragraph 52, she concluded that:

“In the Commissioner’s view, the role of FOISA is important not only in enabling transparency in information held by public authorities, but also in enabling transparency in information about process. In this case, whilst the Commissioner has concluded that, if the advice existed and was held by the Ministers, they would have been entitled to issue a refusal notice under section 16(1), the Commissioner considers that it is in the public interest to know the type of information that the Ministers were taking into account in developing policy in relation to such a significant issue as independence.  While it is a matter for Ministers to take the approach they consider appropriate, this would enable interested parties to form their own opinions on the way in which Ministers develop policy and take decisions.”

The appeal will be extremely interesting both for its importance and for its analysis of the mercurial concept of the public interest which lies at the heart of information rights legislation.

Robin Hopkins

Chagos Refugees Group in the First-Tier Tribunal: some key points

Posted on | by Robin Hopkins

The Chagos Archipelago forms part of the British Indian Ocean Territory (“BIOT”). In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the inhabitants of the Chagos Islands were required to leave those islands. At or around that time, a US military base was established on Diego Garcia, the largest of the Chagos Islands. The removal of the “Chagossians” has been a matter of considerable political and media debate, as well as complex legal proceedings. Two legal challenges are ongoing: Chagos Islanders v UK before the European Court of Human Rights, and Bancoult (No 3) before the domestic courts.

In 1999, the then Foreign Secretary commissioned a feasibility study concerning the possible resettlement of some of the islands. A preliminary study was conducted, followed a “phase 2B” study conducted by external consultants. The final report of the phase 2B study was made public. There was some ministerial correspondence about the studies.

In April 2010, representatives of the Chagossians sought information from the Foreign & Commonwealth Office about these studies. In particular, they asked for any draft versions of the phase 2B study (and any accompanying reports), as well as related ministerial correspondence.

The FCO disclosed some information, but withheld one note to a minister (Baroness Amos). As regards the draft reports, it claimed that – if these existed at the time of the request – they were held by the external consultants who authored them. The FCO maintained that the consultants did not hold that information “on behalf of” the FCO for the purposes of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004. The Commissioner upheld the FCO’s position.

The Tribunal (chaired by Andrew Bartlett QC) upheld the Chagossians’ appeal in part. A disclaimer to the following analysis: I appeared for the Information Commissioner. The post below is not a commentary on the case, but (with my Panopticon hat on) I highlight some of the points of general interest to FOIA and EIR practitioners. For a broader commentary on the case, see the excellent post from David Hart QC on One Crown Office Row’s UK Human Rights Blog.

The Tribunal in Chagos Refugees Group in Mauritius and Chagos Social Committee (Seychelles) v IC and FCO (EA/2011/0300) agreed with the FCO that information held by the consultants was not, at the date of the request, held “on behalf of the FCO” for EIR purposes. The Tribunal applied the guidance on the approach to “held” from University of Newcastle v IC and BUAV [2011] UKUT 185 (AAC), [2011] 2 Info LR 54 (see paragraphs 59-67). Generally, whether information is “held” will be a question of fact, but the Tribunal added that “we would also wish to qualify the proposition in McBride v IC and Ministry of Justice (EA/2007/0105) that whether information is held on behalf of a public authority is “simply a question of fact”. In some cases it will be important to determine the exact nature of the legal relationship between a person holding information and the public authority, or to determine the legal structure pursuant to which information was created and held” (paragraph 61).

The Tribunal analysed both the factual and legal relationship between the FCO and the consultants in reaching its conclusion. Its decision should be given careful attention when considering whether information is “held on behalf of” a public authority.

On the adequacy of the FCO’s own searches, the Tribunal said this at paragraph 70:

“… we consider it is relevant to draw attention also to the Tribunal’s remarks in the context of a FOIA request in Muttitt v IC (EA/2011/0036) (31 January 2012) at [68], to the effect that a search should be conducted intelligently and reasonably, and that this does not mean it should be an exhaustive search conducted in unlikely places: those who request information under FOIA will prefer a good search, delivering most relevant information, to a hypothetical exhaustive search delivering none, because of  the cost limit.”

As to the Baroness Amos note, the Chagossians were largely successful in their appeal: disclosure was ordered, bar a few redactions. In its analysis, the Tribunal considered the time at which the public interest was to be assessed. It has become almost trite in FOIA and EIR cases that the answer to this question is “at the time of the request or, at the latest, the date at which the public authority ought to have responded”. This question is, however, not altogether settled. In this case, the Tribunal was content to assess matters up to the date of the conclusion of the FCO’s internal review (see paragraphs 22-29). On a similar point, the UpperTribunal in Evans (see my earlier post on this) by no means considered it beyond doubt that matters should only be assessed at or shortly after the date of the request.

The Tribunal considered that weighty public interests would be served by disclosure of the contents of the Baroness Amos note, despite that being only a small amount of information. At paragraph 112 it said this:

“The amount of information in a potentially disclosable document is without doubt a material matter to take into account. At the same time, it is important not to discount unduly the significance, in the public interest, of the disclosure of small amounts of information. Publicly useful freedom of information requests are generally limited in scope. If too broad, they face the obstacle under FOIA of the costs limit, and under the EIR of the proportionality requirement. If the Tribunal were to take an unduly minimalist view of the value of the publication of relatively small amounts of information on matters of considerable legitimate public interest, this would materially reduce the effectiveness of the legislation. We would regard this as tending to conflict with the general purpose of  the legislation, as seen in the authoritative remarks in Sugar v BBC [2012] UKSC 4 at [76]-[77], which in our view apply with equal force to the EIR, particularly in view of the presumption in favour of disclosure found in EIR regulation 12(2).”

This outweighed the public interest in maintaining the exception for internal communications. Timing was key to the ‘safe space’ argument advanced by the FCO and the Commissioner. The Tribunal endorsed the approach taken in the Department of Health (NHS risk registers) case, whereby policy formulation can “dip in and out” of the need for a safe space. The Tribunal in this case concluded that (paragraph 123):

“We acknowledge the prospect that at some future date – perhaps in 2013, perhaps later – after the final conclusion of the two pending pieces of litigation, the resettlement policy is likely to be the subject of reconsideration. In our view that was at all material times, and remains today, a very weak reason for maintaining the confidentiality of a document written in entirely different circumstances in 2002.”

Robin Hopkins

The Equitable Life collapse: strong public interests needed to trump s. 30

Posted on | by Robin Hopkins

Wynn v IC and Serious Fraud Office (EA/2011/0185) concerned the dramatic closure in late 2000 of the insurer Equitable Life. Both the Ombudsman and the Penrose Inquiry examined the collapse and published their reports. Attempts to compensate those who lost money have been pursued through the courts and considered by parliament.

The Serious Fraud Office became involved to consider whether any criminal charges should be brought against those involved in the collapse. Pursuant to its functions under the Criminal Justice Act 1987, it analysed the material and took legal advice in order to decide whether or not to commence a criminal investigation. In effect, it investigated whether or not to investigate. In December 2005, the SFO announced that it would not commence an investigation.

Mr Wynn was dissatisfied with that decision. Eventually, in 2009, he asked the SFO for all of the information it held on Equitable Life. It provided him with some information – importantly, this included (pursuant to a direction from the ICO) a ‘vetting note’, which summarised the SFO’s reasoning on why successful prosecutions were unlikely. The SFO withheld the remainder of the voluminous information it held, relying on s. 12 (cost of compliance) for some it and ss. 30(1) (investigations) and 42 (legal professional privilege) for the rest. The ICO agreed.

Mr Wynn’s appeal to the Tribunal was dismissed. The Tribunal was satisfied that the s. 12 estimate was reasonable and well evidenced. S. 30(1) was engaged: a preliminary investigation (or, as I have put it above, an investigation into whether to investigate) was an investigation for s. 30(1) purposes nonetheless.

The public interest favoured maintaining that exemption. Case-specific points included the substantial transparency delivered by the Ombudsman and Penrose Inquiry reports and the SFO’s vetting note. There was nothing to suggest that the SFO had got things wrong.

The decision also contains a number of points of more general application. The Tribunal endorsed the account given in Breeze v Information Commissioner (EA/2011/0057) of the concerns protected by s. 30(1): protecting witnesses and informants (including their confidentiality), maintaining the integrity of the prosecution and judicial process, and ensuring that the court remained the sole forum for determining guilt. The ‘safe space’ point was also important: prosecutors need a safe space in which to make their decisions without any fear their frank assessments being publicised too soon after the event.

Notwithstanding the passage of time between the conclusion of that investigation and the request under FOIA, those factors counted very heavily in favour of maintaining the exemption under s. 30(1). The Tribunal endorsed this general proposition from Public Prosecutor of Northern Ireland v IC (EA/2010/0109): “in order for disclosure to be ordered in such cases public interest factors of at least equal weight would have to be adduced. A general interest in transparency as to a prosecution authority’s decisions will not be sufficient. Something substantial and particular to the information would be required” (paragraph 35).

The general upshot is that, in recent years, s. 30(1) has grown into a ‘strong’ exemption, i.e. one that requires weighty and particular factors to ‘defeat’. ‘Safe space’ arguments have also fared somewhat better in the prosecution context than the policy-making
context (under s. 35 of FOIA) in Tribunal decisions over the last year or two.

Finally, it is long-established that s. 42(1) is a ‘strong’ exemption, requiring weighty factors if disclosure of privileged information is to ordered. None were forthcoming in Wynn.

Robin Hopkins

Wheat and chaff: advice to ministers on answering parliamentary questions

Posted on | by Robin Hopkins

Some years ago, the government commissioned the Tasker Report into the conduct of senior managers in the prison service, which had given rise to extensive and adverse publicity. A number of parliamentary questions were asked about the report. As is the usual practice, civil servants prepared advice for use by the prisons minister, Maria Eagle, in responding to those questions.  Kikugawa v IC and MOJ (EA/2011/0267) involved a request for copies of those advice notes. The MOJ refused to disclose them, relying on s. 36(2)(b) FOIA (prejudice to the free and frank provision of advice or exchange of views), the prerequisite for which is the issuing of a ‘reasonable opinion’ by the ‘qualified person’ (here, the minister) as to the likelihood of those prejudices.

The Tribunal found the exemption to be engaged. Points to note as regards the ‘reasonableness’ of the opinion this, which points towards a margin of discretion:

“The opinion must be her opinion so she cannot simply sign a submission without reading it, though nobody suggests that she did so. Deciding to approve a submission by flipping a coin (an example given by the ICO) does not fail the test because the opinion adopted is unreasonable but because the minister formed no opinion at all. The same principle would apply, though perhaps less vividly, where the minister received a submission advocating this opinion which offered no reason, however slight, to form it. Nobody can truly form an opinion where he or she is deprived of any shred of information on the issues involved. Provided the opinion is formed by the minister, however, it may be debatable how far the Tribunal is entitled to inquire into the mental processes adopted. A degree of caution may be appropriate when approaching the supposed requirement for a “reasonable opinion reasonably formed”.

The requester said the opinion had been biased. The Tribunal disagreed:

“The test is reasonableness, not the apparent objectivity of the QP. If the QP has formed an untenable opinion because of a conflict of interest, then the opinion does not satisfy s.36(2), not because it is the opinion of a biased QP but because it is unreasonable. In fact, the complaint that it is the minister concerned with the PQs whose opinion is sought is unrealistic since it is she who is by far the best placed to form a judgement on the matter. Equally, it is hard to see how officials who had no involvement whatever with the PQs or the background facts could provide an informed submission.”

The requester alleged that the submissions to the minister had been “bogus”, false or “deliberately misleading”. Although the Tribunal noted colourfully that “it is inevitable that, in the stream of advice and comment passed to ministers in the process of answering hundreds of PQs there will be chaff as well as wheat”, it did not find the requester’s allegations to be well founded.

Finally, this was one of those (increasingly rare, it seems) cases where the Tribunal saw force in the ‘chilling effect’ argument:

“The Tribunal is frequently pressed by government departments with claims as to the “chilling effect” on frank communication of disclosure of internal discussions and reports. The Tribunal is not always impressed by them. Here, though, we are dealing with a vital and sensitive interface between minister and civil servant. This is an area of government where the need for confidentiality is clear because the points that need to be made to a minister may be based on evidence of varying strength and may involve strong criticism of the questioner or another member or third party. The official offering advice may be understandably reluctant to make them public, whilst properly concerned that they should be before the minister. It is for the minister to decide what should be used, what rejected, what is too tenuous to be relied upon.”

For all these reasons, the Tribunal firmly rejected the appeal.

Robin Hopkins

CHILLING EFFECT, SAFE SPACE AND THE NHS RISK REGISTERS

Posted on | by Robin Hopkins

In a recent post, Panopticon brought you, hot-off-the-press, the Tribunal’s decision in the much-publicised case of Department of Health v IC, Healey and Cecil (EA/2011/0286 & EA/2011/0287). Somewhat less hot-off-the-press are my observations. This is a very important decision, both for its engagement with the legislative process and for its analysis of the public interest with respect to section 35(1)(a) of FOIA (formulation or development of government policy) – particularly the “chilling effect” argument. At the outset, it is important to be clear about what was being requested and when.

Risk registers in general

The DOH prepared two “risk registers” documenting the risks associated with implementing the “far-reaching and highly controversial” NHS reforms under what was then the Health and Social Care Bill. The Tribunal heard that risk registers are used widely across government for project planning. They provide snapshots (rather than detailed discussions) combining the probability of and outcomes from any given risk associated with the proposed reform; risks are then classified in red, amber or green terms. According to Lord Gus O’Donnell, who gave evidence in support of the DOH’s case, risk registers are the most important tool used across government to formulate and develop policy for risk management in advising ministers. John Healey MP, one of the requesters in this case, said that he was a minister for ten years and was never shown such a register.

The requests and these particular registers

On 29 November 2010, Mr Healey requested a copy of the “Transition Risk Register” (TRR). This, the Tribunal found, was largely concerned with operational matters; it aimed to identify implementation risks. By this stage, the government had already published its White Paper on the reforms. Crucially, the Tribunal’s finding was that the broad policy decision had been taken by the time of the White Paper. The subsequent consultation was largely directed at how best to implement the White Paper. In response to that consultation, the government adhered to the vast majority of its plans, and set about implementing them early where possible.

On 28 February 2011, the second requester, Nicholas Cecil, asked for a copy of the Strategic Risk Register (“SRR”). This was concerned with potential policy decisions for ministers. By that time, the Bill had been laid before Parliament. Parliament’s reaction meant that, in a number of respects, ministers were called upon to rethink policy decisions surrounding the NHS reforms.

Both requests were refused. The IC ordered that they be disclosed. The Tribunal upheld the IC’s decision on the TRR, but allowed the DOH’s appeal on the SRR.

The approach to section 35(1)(a) of FOIA

Before the Tribunal, it was accepted that this exemption was engaged with respect to both registers. The Tribunal considered that the need for a safe space for policy-making was not linear. Its analysis is worth quoting in detail:

“We are prepared to accept that there is no straight line between formulation and development and delivery and implementation. We consider that during the progress of a government introducing a new policy that the need for a safe space will change during the course of a Bill. For example while policy is being formulated at a time of intensive consultation during the initial period when policy is formed and finalised the need for a safe space will be at its highest. Once the policy is announced this need will diminish but while the policy is being debated in Parliament it may be necessary for the government to further develop the policy, and even undertake further public consultation, before the Bill reflects the government’s final position on the new policy as it receives the Royal Assent. Therefore there may be a need to, in effect, dip in and out of the safe space during this passage of time so government can continue to consider its options. There may also come a time in the life of an Act of Parliament when the policy is reconsidered and a safe space is again needed. Such a need for policy review and development may arise from implementation issues which in themselves require Ministers to make decisions giving rise to policy formulation and development. We therefore understand why the UCL report describes the process as a “continuous circle” certainly until a Bill receives the Royal Assent. However the need for safe spaces during this process depends on the facts and circumstances in each case. Critically the strength of the public interest for maintaining the exemption depends on the public interest balance at the time the safe space is being required.

We would also observe that where a Bill is a Framework Bill we can understand that even after it receives the Royal Assent there will be a need for safe spaces for policy formulation as secondary legislation is developed. We note in this case that the Bill, although suggested by DOH to be a Framework Bill, is prescriptive of economic regulation, and cannot be described purely in framework terms.”

Public interest factors in favour of maintaining the exemption: safe space and chilling effect

One of the DOH’s witnesses contended that the registers allowed a safe space for officials to “think the unthinkable”, but the Tribunal found it difficult to see how the registers – particularly the TRR – could be described in that way: “the TRR identifies the sorts of risks one would expect to see in such a register from a competent Department”. Nonetheless, the Tribunal accepted the strong public interest in there being a safe space for policy formulation.

The main argument concerned the chilling effect, which Lord O’Donnell addressed in his evidence. The Tribunal considered that there was no actual evidence of the chilling effect following other instances of comparable disclosures (e.g. following OGC v IC (EA/2006/2068 & 80), or following a 2008 disclosure of a risk register concerning a third runway at Heathrow). Similarly, a 2010 report from UCL’s Constitution Unit concluded there to be little evidence for the chilling effect.

Overall, the Tribunal cautioned against treating qualified exemptions as absolute ones. It said:

“We would observe that the DOH’s position expressed in evidence is tantamount to saying that there should be an absolute exemption for risk registers at the stages the registers were requested in this case. Parliament has not so provided. S.35 (and s.36) are qualified exemptions subject to a public interest test, which means that there is no absolute guarantee that information will not be disclosed, however strong the public interest in maintaining the exemption.”

Factors in favour of disclosure

The DOH’s witnesses sought to play down the significance of the NHS reforms in comparison to other important reforms implemented by government. Mr Healey, however, argued that they were exceptional. The Tribunal agreed with him.

It also noted that the Conservatives’ manifesto for the 2010 election had promised an end to top-down NHS reorganisation, but that its NHS White Paper then appeared to propose exactly such a reorganisation. It was not preceded by a Green Paper. It was clear to the Tribunal that the White Paper was published in a hurry and to much public concern. Given the scale and controversial nature of the reforms, transparency of decision-making was very important.

The Tribunal found the public interest balance to be very difficult in this case. Judging the matters at the time of the DOH’s refusal notices, the Tribunal concluded that the balance favoured disclosure of the TRR but not the SRR – due to the differences in the nature of the registers and the timing of the requests (see above).

Section 40(2) of FOIA and civil servants’ names

Finally, the Tribunal also considered the DOH’s reliance on section 40(2) to redact the names of a number of civil servants on the grounds of their being insufficiently senior for disclosure to be fair. The Tribunal ordered the disclosure of the majority of these names. In so doing, it focused on the substance of what each individual did with respect to this particular information – rather than on their Civil Service grades.

Robin Hopkins