Data Protection Regulation Update

You know how it took you years to get your head around what the Data Protection Act 1998 meant? Well, the new general Data Protection Regulation took one step closer towards ripping up Directive 95/46/EC (and therefore the DPA) today. The Commission’s proposals for the new Regulation have now been signed off by the Justice Ministers (see press release here). The Commission informs us that the first meeting in the trilogue between the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU will take place on 24 June, and the aim is to have a text agreed before 2015 is out. The trilogue is where all the nitty gritty stuff has still to be hammered out, and plenty of changes are likely through that process, but at least we have a little more of an idea now of the timescale.

Christopher Knight

Le Right to be Forgotten

Bonjour, et maintenant pour un post de Panopticon dans le style de Miles Kington et ‘Franglais’.

Recallez-vous le judgment de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne dans Google Spain (ici)? Tres bien. Maintenant, il y a une announcement from CNIL (le ICO de France), informing Google that le ‘right to be forgotten’ applies aux search results decouvert en google.fr et google.com, pas seulement google.fr (voila, ici). Ce n’est pas une announcemente populaire avec Google, mais ce n’est pas une surprise. Dans November 2014 le Article 29 Working Party adopted ‘Guidelines on the Implementation’ of Google Spain, which said the same thing, as an aspect of the principle of effective protection of data subjects’ rights. C’est believed que la France est le premier data protection authority to expressly and publicly take this line with Google. Les developments dans le future sont tres interessant.

(That’s enough of that. Another issue which has caused some interest is the approach Google are taking whereby any search result on google.co.uk for an individual name comes back with the rider at the foot that some search results may have been omitted as a result of Google Spain, regardless of whether they have been or not. This raises some interesting possible questions in defamation (could it be defamatory to imply that an individual has exercised their Google Spain rights?), privacy (does the implication itself invade private life and reputation?) and DPA compliance (is the approach justified because only having the notice where the right has been exercised is tantamount to undermining the exercise of the right, and would no notice at all be too secretive?). That will also be interesting to see if anyone follows it up with Google, the ICO and then the courts. For those of you want to see a bit more analysis, and an example of a complaint, listen carefully, I shall say zis only once: Jon Baines’ blog discusses it ici. Eh bien.)

Ce n’est pas ‘goodbye’, mais seulement ‘au revoir’.

Christophe Chevalier

Ittihadieh Judgment Now Available

Almost a month ago, I blogged about a decision of the High Court in Ittihadieh v 5-11 Cheyne Gardens RTM Co Ltd & 6 others [2015] EWHC 1491 (QB), noting that the judgment was not yet available. Since then my postbag has been inundated with letters (sample from a Mrs Trellis of North Wales, “Dear Robin Hopkins, If data protection is so important, why does the postman keep delivering my letters next door?”) haranguing me for further information. Following a suitable period to allow excitement to build, I am happy to oblige. It may now be seen here: Ittihadieh v Cheyne Gdns APPROVED judgment 05 05 15.

It is not necessary to repeat the commentary already provided in the previous post. HHJ Seymour QC did indeed construe the SAR as being directed only to the company – based on the wording of it and the payment of only one £10 fee – but he also held that directors would not have been data controllers themselves, applying Southern Pacific Personal Loans [2013] EWHC 2485 (Admin). The relevance of the domestic purposes exemption in section 36 came about because it was suggested some of the company directors may have expressed views about the Claimant amongst themselves in a personal capacity. This, thought the judge, would fall within section 36. In any event, he would have exercised his general and untrammelled discretion (applying Durant) under section 7(9) not to make any order requiring them to search personal email accounts.

Finally, at [50], comes a reminder that even post Vidal-Hall not every potential breach will sound in damages, as the court noted the claim for distress and expressed severe doubts about it in the following terms:

“It is not necessary or appropriate for me to give lengthy consideration to the prospect that Mr. Ittihadieh has suffered distress, but the material before me does indicate that Mr. Ittihadieh is a person who is accustomed to defending his corner, to put it colloquially, if necessary, or perhaps even if not necessary, by resort to legal proceedings, or threat of legal proceedings, and he certainly seems to engage in the expression of colourful phrases in the English language which are not used in polite society. That use of language suggests that he, himself, may not be a particularly sensitive flower.”

That is not to say that the “sensitive flower” test is one which should be applied generally (one struggles to see Max Mosley, to pick a sadomasochistic example at random, meeting the test), but it is an expression of judicial realism.

UPDATE: As some readers will know, Mr Ittihadieh has been granted permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal against the judgment. The issues in the appeal are to be wide-ranging and it will be a useful and welcome opportunity for the Court of Appeal to grapple with the practical working of the DPA in a way which has not really been seen since Durant. In the meantime, the High Court judgment has a question mark over it.

Christopher Knight

Disclosing child protection information: make sure you ask the right questions first

High-profile revelations in recent years illustrate the importance of public authorities sharing information on individuals who are of concern in relation to child protection matters. When inaccurate information is shared, however, the consequences for the individual can be calamitous.

AB v Chief Constable of Hampshire Constabulary [2015] EWHC 1238 (Admin) is a recent High Court judgment (Jeremy Baker J) which explores the implications of such inaccurate disclosures. The case is not only about inaccuracies per se, but about why those inaccuracies were not picked up before the disclosure was made.

Perhaps the most notable point from the judgment is this: if such a disclosure is to be necessary, then the data controller must take care to ask themselves reasonable questions about that information, check it against other obvious sources, and make necessary enquiries before disclosure takes place.

In other words, failure to ask the right questions can lead to the wrong course of action in privacy terms. Here is how that principle played out in the AB case.

Background

In 2010, AB was summarily dismissed from his job as a science teacher for inappropriate comments and conduct with potential sexual undertones, as well as a failure to maintain an appropriately professional boundary with students. His appeal against dismissal failed. The Independent Safeguarding Authority, however, decided not to include AB on its barred lists. The General Teaching Council also investigated AB, but it did not find that the allegations of improper conduct were made out.

AB’s dismissal, however, came to the attention of a member of the child abuse investigation public protection unit of the Hampshire Constabulary. Enquiries were made of the college, and certain email correspondence and records were generated and retained on police systems.

Later the following year, AB was offered a teaching job elsewhere. This came to the police’s attention in 2013. There was internal discussion within the police about this. One officer said in an email that, among other things (i) AB had also been dismissed from another school, and (ii) AB’s 2010 dismissal had involved inappropriate touching between himself and pupils. There was no evidence that either of those points was true. That email concluded “From What I’ve been told he should be nowhere near female students. I will put an intel report in on [AB]”.

The above information was passed to the Local Authority Designated Officer (‘LADO’) and in turn to the school, who terminated AB’s employment. He then made a subject access request under the DPA, by which he learnt of the above communication, and also the source of that information, which was said to be a notebook containing a police officer’s notes from 2010 (which did not in fact record either (i) or (ii) above). AB complained of the disclosure and also of the relevant officer’s failures to follow the requisite safeguarding procedures. The police dismissed his complaint.

The Court’s judgment

AB sought judicial review of both the disclosure of the inaccurate email in the email, and of the dismissal of his complaint about the police officer’s conduct in his reporting of the matter.

The Court (Jeremy Baker J) granted the application on both issues. I focus here on the first, namely the lawfulness of the disclosure in terms of Article 8 ECHR.

Was the disclosure “in accordance with the law” for Article 8 purposes?

The Court considered the key authorities in this – by now quite well-developed – area of law (Article 8 in the context of disclosures by the police), notably:

MM v United Kingdom [2010] ECHR 1588 (the retention and disclosure of information relating to an individual by a public authority engages Article 8, and must therefore be justified under Article 8(2));

Tysiac v Poland (2007) 45 EHRR 42, where the ECtHR stressed the importance of procedural safeguards to protecting individuals’ Article 8 rights from unlawful interference by public bodies;

R v Chief Constable of North Wales Ex. Parte Thorpe [1999] QB 396: a decision about whether or not to disclose the identity of paedophiles to members of the public, is a highly sensitive one. “Disclosure should only be made when there is a pressing need for that disclosure”);

R (L) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2010] 1 AC 410: such cases are essentially about proportionality;

R (A) v Chief Constable of Kent [2013] EWCA Civ 1706: such a disclosure is often “in practice the end of any opportunity for the individual to be employed in an area for which an [Enhanced Criminal Record Certificate] is required. Balancing the risks of non-disclosure to the interests of the members of the vulnerable group against the right of the individual concerned to respect for his or her private life is a particularly sensitive and difficult exercise where the allegations have not been substantiated and are strongly denied”;

R (T) v Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police & others [2015] AC 49 and R (Catt) v ACPO [2015] 2 WLR 664 on whether disclosures by police were in accordance with the law and proportionate.

The Court concluded that, in light of the above authorities, the disclosure made in AB’s case was “in accordance with the law”. It was made under the disclosure regime made up of: Part V of the Police Act 1997, the Home Office’s Statutory Disclosure Guidance on enhanced criminal records certificates, section 10 of the Children Act 2004 and the Data Protection Act 1998.

See Jeremy Baker J’s conclusion – and notes of caution – at [73]-[75]:

“73. In these circumstances it seems to me that not only does the common law empower the police to disclose relevant information to relevant parties, where it is necessary for one of these police purposes, but that the DPA 1998, together with the relevant statutory and administrative codes, provide a sufficiently clear, accessible and consistent set of rules, so as to prevent arbitrary or abusive interference with an individual’s Article 8 rights; such that the disclosure will be in accordance with law.

74. However, it will clearly be necessary in any case, and in particular in relation to a decision to disclose information to a third party, for the decision-maker to examine with care the context in which his/her decision is being made.

75. In the present case, although the disclosure of the information by the police was to a LADO in circumstances involving the safeguarding of children, it also took place in the context of the claimant’s employment. The relevance of this being, as DC Pain was clearly aware from the contents of his e-mail to PS Bennett dated 10th June 2013, that the disclosure of the information had the potential to adversely affect the continuation of the claimant’s employment at the school….”

Was the disclosure proportionate?

While the disclosure decision was in accordance with the law, this did not remove the need for the police carefully to consider whether disclosure was necessary and proportionate, particularly in light of the serious consequences of disclosure for AB’s employment.

The Court held that the disclosure failed these tests. The crucial factor was that if such information about AB was well founded, then it would have been contained in his Enhanced Criminal Record Certificate – and if it was not, this would have prompted enquiries about the cogency of the information (why, if it was correct, was such serious information omitted from the ECRC?) which would reasonably have been pursued to bottom the matter out before the disclosure was made. These questions had not been asked in this case. See [80]-[81]:

“… In these circumstances, it was in my judgment, a necessary procedural step for DC Pain to ascertain from the DBS unit as to, whether, and if so, what information it had already disclosed on any enhanced criminal record certificate, as clearly if the unit had already disclosed the information which DC Pain believed had been provided to him by the college, then it would not have been necessary for him to have made any further disclosure of that information.

81. If either DC Pain or PS Bennett had taken this basic procedural step, then not only would it have been immediately obvious that this information had not been provided to the school, but more importantly, in the context of this case, it would also have been obvious that further enquiries were required to be made: firstly as to why no such disclosure had been made by the DBS unit; and secondly, once it had been ascertained that the only information which was in the possession of the DBS unit was the exchange of e-mails on the defendant’s management system, as to the accuracy of the information with which DC Pain believed he had been provided by the college.”

Judicial reviews of disclosure decisions concerning personal data: the DPA as an alternative remedy?

Finally, the Court dealt with a submission that judicial review should not be granted as this case focused on what was essentially a data protection complaint, which could have been taken up with the ICO under the DPA (as was suggested in Lord Sumption’s comments in Catt). That submission was dismissed: AB had not simply ignored or overlooked that prospect, but had rather opted to pursue an alternative course of complaint; the DPA did not really help with the police conduct complaint, and the case raised important issues.

Robin Hopkins @hopkinsrobin

Mosley v Google: RIP

So Max Mosley has done a deal with Google in respect of his claim that Google had breached his rights under the DPA 1998 by refusing to block certain images and videos accessible via the Google search engine (see this FT article which suggests that the settlement also applies to claims brought by Mr Mosley in Germany and France). The settlement of the claim, which follows on from Google’s failed strike out application (discussed further below), leaves unanswered a number of really important questions concerning the application of data protection rights in the online world. Not least, the settlement leaves open the question of the extent to which the so-called ‘right to be forgotten’ can operate so as to force internet search engines, not only to de-index individual URLs on request, but also to block access to the offending data globally (i.e. as ISEs already do, for example, where images of child pornography are identified).

This is an important issue for those data subjects who garner significant public attention within the online environment, as was the case with Mr Mosley. The difficulty for such individuals is that online stories or comments about them can proliferate on the internet at such a rate that they cannot practicably achieve the online amnesia they crave. No sooner have they requested that the relevant internet search engine remove a number of privacy-invasive links, than the story has sprung up in a raft of other different locations on the net, with the result that the individual is effectively left trying to capture lightening in a bottle. This raises the question as to whether a right to be forgotten mechanism which is limited to de-indexing only specific those URL’s identified by the data subject is fit for purpose in terms of achieving the outcomes envisaged by the CJEU in Google Spain. Put shortly, if the ISE is the lightening conductor for privacy intrusive data, can it properly be required to stop the lightening at its source and block all access to the data in question? Is this the way in which the right to be forgotten ultimately cashes out in the online world?

Which takes us on to the defences which Google sought to run in the Mosley case because, certainly in the context of the strike out application, Google was not seeking to argue that data in issue (images and video of Mr Mosley engaging in private sexual activity) was not private or that its online dissemination did not cause substantial damage or substantial distress to Mr Mosley for the purposes of s. 10. Nor did Google seek to dispute that the damage or distress suffered by Mr Mosley was ‘unwarranted’ for the purposes of s. 10(1). Instead, its entire case in the context of the strike out was mounted on the basis that it was shielded from all liability under the DPA by virtue of the protections afforded to intermediary ‘internet society services’ (ISSs) under Part IV of the E-Commerce Directive (Directive 2000/31/EC).

For the uninitiated, Part IV of the E-Commerce Directive is designed to afford protections to intermediary ISSs which are genuine data intermediaries in the sense that they merely transmit, cache (i.e. store) or host data generated by others. The idea which lies behind Part IV is that the development of electronic commerce within the information society, one of the key objectives of the E-Commerce Directive (see recital [2]), would be frustrated if entities acting essentially as online data messengers could too readily get shot by third party claimants. Thus, we see:

  • in Article 12 a limitation on liability where the ISS is acting as a mere conduit;
  • in Article 13 a limitation on liability where the ISS is merely caching the data;
  • in Article 14 a limitation on liability where the ISS is merely hosting the data (this was the provision invoked by Facebook in CG v Facebook, as to which see my post here) and, finally,
  • in Article 15 a specific exclusion of any general obligation on the part of the ISS to monitor content falling within the scope of Articles 12, 13 or 14.

Google’s case on the strike out was that it was not liable in respect of Mr Mosley’s claim under s. 10 DPA on the basis that: (a) it was merely caching the data in issue (thus Article 13 of the E-Commerce Directive was engaged) and, in any event (b) the order being sought by Mr Mosley would conflict with the requirement of Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive, as it would result in Google having to engage in general monitoring of cached content.

Mitting J considered both of these arguments in the context of Google’s strike out application (see his judgment here). So far as Google’s case on Article 13 was concerned, Mitting J clearly took the view that, where an individual’s data protection rights are being infringed by virtue of an ISS’s continued processing of privacy-invasive data, there is nothing in Article 13 of the E-Commerce Directive which purports to limit the ISS’s liability to cease processing that data; quite the contrary Article 13(2) specifically leaves the door open to a cease processing order being made in these circumstances (see in particular [47]). This conclusion dovetailed with Mitting J’s more general (albeit provisional) conclusion that the Data Protection Directive and the E-Commerce Directive were intended to work ‘in harmony’ with one another (see [45]-46]). On the Article 15 defence, Mitting J was clearly sceptical about Google’s argument that the order being sought by Mr Mosley would result in the kind of general monitoring which was ostensibly prohibited by Article 15 [54]. However, he accepted that this was an issue which would have to be decided by the trial judge.

Of course, in light of the recent settlement, it is clear that that issues concerning Google’s Article 15 defence are now unfortunately not going to be decided by the trial judge. Which leaves us all pondering in particular the following important questions:

  • First, where right to be forgotten claims are formulated as claims to have data blocked by the relevant ISE, will such claims in practice effectively require a form of general monitoring by the ISE?
  • Second, if they do require a form of general monitoring, does that mean that the claims must fail by reference to Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive or does Article 15 itself have to fall silent in the face of the imperatives of the data protection legislation? (Mitting J made clear in his judgment he was not expressing a view on this issue)
  • Third, what about claims for compensation brought against an ISE which refuses to block data? Do E-Commerce principles afforded ISEs a refuge against such claims? (Notably, Mitting J had stayed Mr Mosley’s compensation claim pending the outcome in Vidal-Hall so he did not address this issue).

It is perhaps worth pointing out here that no reference was made in Mitting J’s judgment to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (presumably because Charter rights were not specifically relied on in argument). Obviously in the post-Vidal-Hall world, Charter rights – including not least Article 8 (concerning the protection of personal data) – are bound to play a dominating role in discussions concerning the relationship between the E-Commerce Directive and data protection rights. Which all tends to suggest that this is an area which remains rich in litigation potential.

Finally, it should be pointed out that as at today’s date the various images which Mr Mosley was seeking suppress all appear still to be available online via Google. It remains to be seen whether in time these images will in fact quietly sink into the soup of online forgetfulness.

Anya Proops

Life for the CD Yet

Does anyone remember compact discs? Isn’t everything downloadable from iTunes, or Napster, or whatever it is that young people are using these days? Well, to the joy of crotchety old people everywhere, the court system still uses CDs. Indeed, the Upper Tribunal records hearings before it on CD, and when a litigant wants access to those recordings the Upper Tribunal may take the view that it is interests of justice to disclose it to them. (We are not yet at the thrilling stage of having Upper Tribunal hearings filmed and made available online, as in the Supreme Court. One cannot imagine why.)

So it was in the case of Mr Edem – he of ‘is a name personal data?’ fame – who did not approve of being given his recordings but under terms which did not permit him to more widely disclose them. Instead, he sought them under FOIA and was met with the fairly predictable reliance by the Ministry of Justice on the absolute exemption for court records in section 32(1)(c). Aha, said Mr Edem, but a CD is not a “document” within the meaning of section 32(1).

This may come as something of a surprise argument to anyone looking at the broad definition of information in section 84, the approach of the Court of Appeal in IPSA (see here), the Upper Tribunal decision in Peninsula Business Services v ICO & Ministry of Justice [2014] UKUT 284 (AAC), and indeed common sense. It is less of a surprise to see the argument fail in Edem v ICO & Ministry of Justice [2015] UKUT 210 (AAC).

Judge Wikeley had little difficulty in accepting that the purpose of section 32(1), to enable the courts to control access to their own files and records, indicates a broader interpretation of document than merely paper files, and the effect of the distinction that an audio record would not be caught but a transcript would be was patently not intended to be the outcome. In any event, a document is simply something which contains information. It does not determine the form or mode of container. Various cases from different contexts (including of course the Kennedy litigation under FOIA) gave support for the conclusion that “document” naturally includes an audio recording which contains relevant information. In so concluding, Judge Wikeley reached precisely the same conclusion as Judge Williams had done in Peninsula. The Upper Tribunal also dismissed the argument that simply because the use of “document” in section 25 (on national security certificates) must mean a written document because of the specific context of a certificate did not require the same interpretation generally: a written document is a document but the reverse is not true. The strike out of the appeal was upheld.

Rupert Paines appeared for the ICO; Rachel Kamm was for the MoJ.

Christopher Knight