It is increasingly common for requests for disclosure in pre-action or other litigation correspondence to include a subject access request under section 7 of the Data Protection Act 1998. Litigants dissatisfied with the response to such requests often make applications for disclosure. Where an application is made in the usual way (i.e. under the CPR, rather than as a claim under section 7 of the DPA), how should it be approached? As a subject access request, with the “legal proceedings” exemption (section 35) arising for consideration, or as an “ordinary” disclosure application under CPR Rule 31? If the latter, what role (if any) do data protection rights play in the analysis of what should be disclosed?
As the Court of Appeal in Durham County Council v Dunn [2012] EWCA Civ 1654 observed in a judgment handed down today, there is much confusion and inconsistency of approach to these questions. Difficulties are exacerbated when the context is particularly sensitive – local authority social work records being a prime example. Anyone grappling with disclosure questions about records of that type will need to pay close attention to the Dunn judgment.
Background to the disclosure application
Mr Dunn alleged that he had suffered assaults and systemic negligence while in local authority care. He named individual perpetrators. He also said he had witnessed similar acts of violence being suffered by at other boys. He brought proceedings against the local authority. His solicitors asked for disclosure of various documents; included in the list of requested disclosure was the information to which Mr Dunn was entitled under section 7 of the DPA. Some documents were withheld from inspection, apparently on data protection grounds.
Mr Dunn made a disclosure application in the usual way, i.e. he did not bring a section 7 DPA claim. The District Judge assessed the application in data protection terms. He ordered disclosure with the redaction of names and addresses of residents of the care facility – but not those of staff members and other agents, who would not suffer the same stigmas or privacy incursions from such disclosure.
Mr Dunn said he could not pursue his claim properly without witnesses and, where appropriate, their contact details. He appealed successfully against the disclosure order. The order for redaction was overturned. The judge’s approach was to consider this under the CPR (this being a civil damages claim) – but to take the DPA into account as a distinct consideration in reaching his disclosure decision.
The relevance of the DPA
The Court of appeal upheld the use of the CPR as the correct regime for the analysis. It also upheld the appeal judge’s ultimate conclusion. It said, however, that he went wrong in treating the DPA as a distinct consideration when considering a disclosure application under the CPR. With such applications, the DPA is a distraction (paragraphs 21 and 23 of the judgment of Maurice Kay LJ). It is potentially “misleading to refer to a duty to protect data as if it were a category of exemption from disclosure or inspection. The true position is that CPR31, read as a whole, enables and requires the court to excuse disclosure or inspection on public interest grounds” (paragraph 21).
This was not to dismiss the usefulness of a subject access request to those contemplating litigation. See paragraph 16:
“I do not doubt that a person in the position of the claimant is entitled – before, during or without regard to legal proceedings – to make an access request pursuant to section 7. I also understand that such a request prior to the commencement of proceedings may be attractive to prospective claimants and their solicitors. It is significantly less expensive than an application to the Court for disclosure before the commencement of proceedings pursuant to CPR31.16. Such an access may result in sufficient disclosure to satisfy the prospective claimant’s immediate needs. However, it has its limitations. For one thing, the duty of the data controller under section 7 is not expressed in terms of disclosure of documents but refers to communication of “information” in “an intelligible form”. Although this may be achieved by disclosure of copies of original documents, possibly redacted pursuant to section 7(5), its seems to me that it may also be achievable without going that far. Secondly, if the data subject is dissatisfied by the response of the data controller, his remedy is by way of proceedings pursuant to section 7 which would be time-consuming and expensive in any event. They would also engage the CPR at that stage: Johnson v Medical Defence Union [2005] 1 WLR 750; [2004] EWCH 2509 (Ch).”
Instead, the CPR disclosure analysis should balance Article 6 and Article 8 rights in the context of the particular litigation.
Maurice Kay LJ summed up the requisite approach as follows:
“What does that approach require? First, obligations in relation to disclosure and inspection arise only when the relevance test is satisfied. Relevance can include “train of inquiry” points which are not merely fishing expeditions. This is a matter of fact, degree and proportionality. Secondly, if the relevance test is satisfied, it is for the party or person in possession of the document or who would be adversely affected by its disclosure or inspection to assert exemption from disclosure or inspection. Thirdly, any ensuing dispute falls to be determined ultimately by a balancing exercise, having regard to the fair trial rights of the party seeking disclosure or inspection and the privacy or confidentiality rights of the other party and any person whose rights may require protection. It will generally involve a consideration of competing ECHR rights. Fourthly, the denial of disclosure or inspection is limited to circumstances where such denial is strictly necessary. Fifthly, in some cases the balance may need to be struck by a limited or restricted order which respects a protected interest by such things as redaction, confidentiality rings, anonymity in the proceedings or other such order. Again, the limitation or restriction must satisfy the test of strict necessity.”
How to approach disclosure of social work records in litigation
This issue was dealt with by Munby LJ. In short, the main question was whether those seeking to withhold or redact social work records in litigation should analyse the issue in terms of public interest immunity (as some textbooks, older authorities and even the White Book appeared to suggest) or in terms of a balancing between competing rights under the ECHR (in particular, Articles 6 and 8).
Munby LJ made clear that the right answer is the latter. Where information contained in social work records is to be withheld in legal proceedings, this should not now be on the basis of a claim to public interest immunity; we are “a world away from 1970 or even 1989” (paragraph 43). This was despite the fact that “the casual reader of the White Book” (paragraph 31.3.33 in particular) could be forgiven for thinking that PII applies to local authority social work records. Here Munby LJ said he “would respectfully suggest that the treatment of this important topic in the White Book is so succinct as to be inadvertently misleading” (paragraph 48).
Importantly, Munby LJ also went on to explain how (and with what stringency) Article 8 rights to privacy and the protection of personal information should be approached when disclosing information pursuant to litigation. At paragraph 50, he gave the following guidance:
“… particularly in the light of the Convention jurisprudence, disclosure is never a simply binary question: yes or no. There may be circumstances, and it might be thought that the present is just such a case, where a proper evaluation and weighing of the various interests will lead to the conclusion that (i) there should be disclosure but (ii) the disclosure needs to be subject to safeguards. For example, safeguards limiting the use that may be made of the documents and, in particular, safeguards designed to ensure that the release into the public domain of intensely personal information about third parties is strictly limited and permitted only if it has first been anonymised. Disclosure of third party personal data is permissible only if there are what the Strasbourg court in Z v Finland (1998) 25 EHRR 373, paragraph 103, referred to as “effective and adequate safeguards against abuse.” An example of an order imposing such safeguards can be found in A Health Authority v X (Discovery: Medical Conduct) [2001] 2 FLR 673, 699 (appeal dismissed A Health Authority v X [2001] EWCA Civ 2014, [2002] 1 FLR 1045).”
Robin Hopkins