ELECTORAL COMMISSION’S INVESTIGATION INTO UNLAWFUL POLITICAL DONATIONS: PERSONAL AND NON-PERSONAL DATA

Wendy Alexander MSP became leader of the Labour Party group in the Scottish Parliament in September 2007. In the course of her leadership election campaign, someone in her team recorded a donation of £950 as coming from a domestically-based company, whereas it in fact came (unlawfully) from an overseas-based individual. The Electoral Commission investigated two potential criminal offences that arose under the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000. In February 2008, it issued what the Information Tribunal described as a “meagre statement”. It said that there was insufficient evidence of an offence under section 61 (knowingly facilitating, concealing or disguising an impermissible donation), but it acknowledged – implicitly – that an offence under section 56(3) (failure to return an impermissible donation within 30 days). Nonetheless, the case was not referred to the Procurator Fiscal. Many were dissatisfied with the investigation.

 

The requester in this case sought further information. Answers to a number of his questions were withheld. The Tribunal in Ferguson v IC and The Electoral Commission (EA/2010/0085) has today handed down a decision which is notable both for its commentary on the interaction between personal data and the inherent publicity of political life, and for a number of distinctions it draws between types of information which, at first glance, may appear to be personal.

 

Broadly, there were two types of question in dispute. One type sought the names of those who provided the Electoral Commission with answers to certain questions. Applying Durant, the Tribunal held that this was not personal data. Even if it were personal data, a Schedule 2 condition would be met, and the processing would be lawful and fair because there was no indication that interviewees had an expectation of confidentiality. The Tribunal emphasised that fairness does involve a balance of competing interests. Section 30(1) was engaged, but the public interest favoured disclosure. Here the Tribunal rejected the submission that disclosure would undermine voluntary co-operation with the Electoral Commission’s investigations: “politicians and their supporters have strong incentives to co-operate with the Commission”.

 

The second type was about who had misrecorded the donation and why. This was held to be sensitive personal data. The Tribunal cautioned against generalising about FOIA being purpose-blind: an applicant’s identity and motives may sometimes shed light on the public interests involved, and on whether conditions from Schedules 2 and 3 are met. In this case, however, a Schedule 3 condition was not met: the Tribunal was not persuaded that, at the relevant time, the answers the appellant sought were necessary for him to obtain legal advice on a possible application for judicial review of the Electoral Commission.

 

The Tribunal remarked that the appellant would have had a “strongly arguable case” under condition 6(1) of Schedule 2, and made a number of observations on fairness. It commented that “politics is an inherently public activity. The extent and manner of compliance with the rules should be expected to be subject to public scrutiny”. The Tribunal did, however, distinguish between the section 56 offence (implicit finding of guilt) and the section 61 offence (explicit finding of insufficient evidence). Disclosure concerning the former would not be unfair: Ms Alexander “would be well able to say in mitigation anything that she wished by making public statements, as any serious politician would”. Disclosure concerning the latter would be unfair: it “would risk placing the data subjects under a cloud of suspicion, in circumstances where there might be no definitive termination of speculation and where, as a result, undue distress would be likely to ensue”.

 

GOOGLE ESCAPES FINE OVER STREET VIEW CARS, BUT MUST SIGN UNDERTAKING

Google used cars equipped with cameras to gather material for its much-publicised Street View feature. The material was not confined to photographs, but also included data by which wi-fi hotspots could be located. Earlier in 2010, the ICO investigated this ‘payload data’. It concluded that the information it had inspected was not personal data, in that it could not be linked to identifiable individuals. The ICO stated, however, that it would continue to work with its international counterparts, such as the Canadian authorities, in investigating Google. This co-operation has now shown the payload data to include URLs, passwords and email details.

 

The ICO today announced that:

 

“The Commissioner has concluded that there was a significant breach of the Data Protection Act when Google Street View cars collected payload data as part of their wi-fi mapping exercise in the UK. He has instructed Google UK to sign an undertaking in which the company commits to take action to ensure that breaches of this kind cannot happen again. An audit of Google UK’s Data Protection practices will also be undertaken. The Commissioner has rejected calls for a monetary penalty to be imposed but is well placed to take further regulatory action if the undertaking is not fully complied with”.

 

This follows the ICO’s press release on Monday, in which it commented that:

 

“It is also important to note that none of the regulators currently investigating Google Street View have taken direct enforcement action at this stage, with the US investigation led by the US Federal Trade Commission for example ruling out direct action, although mirroring our own concern that this data was allowed to be collected by an organisation who showed such disregard for international data protection legislation. This week the Metropolitan Police have also closed their case believing it would not be appropriate to pursue a criminal case against Google under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA). Whilst we continue to work with our other international counterparts on this issue we will not be panicked into a knee jerk response to an alarmist agenda.”

 

The latter press release also explained the ICO is “keen to discuss with MPs and Ministers how we can further defend privacy on the internet as technologies and applications develop”. In this regard, the Guardian reports today that culture minister Ed Vaizey is proposing a new internet code of conduct and a mediation mechanism to resolve complaints by individuals against data controllers. He is reportedly meeting with the ICO today to discuss these matters. Watch this space.

 

LPP

Legal professional privilege (“LPP”) as an exemption from disclosure under Section 42 of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (“FoIA”) and Regulation 12 of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 arose again in West v Information Commissioner, EA/2010/0120.  Bexley Council had transferred a major part of its Council housing stock to a Housing Association.  Mr West is a member of a leaseholders’ group that objected to having to pay service charges for the cost of the maintenance of roads and footpaths within the housing estates.  They said that remained the responsibility of the Council.  They sought to challenge the lawfulness of the stock transfer agreement.  The Council took advice from Counsel.  Mr West sought a copy of Counsel’s Opinion.  The Council refused to provide it, relying on LPP.  The Information Commissioner upheld the Council’s refusal.  The Tribunal dismissed Mr West’s appeal.  Not only might “legal advice privilege” apply.  So too might “litigation privilege”.  Mr West had threatened to bring a case before the Leasehold Valuation Tribunal and/or judicial review proceedings.  The real issue was the Public Interest Test.  The Tribunal duly identified the public interest factors in maintaining the exception, referring to DBERR v O’Brien [2009] EWHC 164, and the public interest factors in disclosure.  Weighing up and balancing the competing public interests, and bearing in mind the presumption in favour of disclosure, the Tribunal (Judge Shanks presiding) agreed with the Commissioner that the public interest in maintaining the LLP exception outweighed the public interest in disclosure.

James Goudie QC

DRAFT DATA SHARING CODE OF PRACTICE

The Information Commissioner is currently consulting on a draft Data Sharing Code of Practice. Subject to consultation and obtaining the Secretary of State’s approval, this will be a statutory code of practice issued under sections 52A and 52D of the Data Protection Act 1998 which can be used as evidence in any legal proceedings. The draft code is relatively short  (less than 40 pages) and does not include as much practical detail as perhaps might have been expected. It is available on the Information Commissioner’s website (ww.ico.gov.uk)  and the consultation period closes on 5 January 2011.  

COUNCIL ENTITLED TO WITHHOLD PROPERTY DEVELOPER’S FINANCIAL MODEL: BRISTOL CITY DISTINGUISHED

Bath & North East Somerset Council v IC (EA/2010/0045) is the latest application of the ‘commercial confidentiality’ exemption under regulation 12(5)(e) EIR to a request for information on agreements between a local authority and a property developer.

 

The council and the developer entered into discussions about building homes on 70 acres of brownfield land within a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Only a small proportion of this land was owned by the council, the rest being owned by the developer, who would also bear 100% of the risk of the project. The proposed £500m project would deliver 50% of the council’s new homes target for the next 10 years – the council was therefore acting as both beneficiary and planning authority.

 

With a potential section 106 agreement in mind, the council and developer reached a co-operation agreement, whereby the developer taking an ‘open book’ approach, i.e. making its financial models and reports available to the council. This was the information at issue before the Tribunal.

 

The Tribunal found that the public interest favoured maintaining the exemption. In so doing, it distinguished this case from Bristol City Council v ICO and Portland and Brunswick Squares Association (EA/2010/0012) – on which, see my post here and article in the Local Government Lawyer here – where disclosure of the information was ordered. Bristol City concerned a viability assessment designed to show that a hypothetical scheme was not viable; that assessment used generic, industry-level pricing. In contrast, this case concerned detailed and developer-specific financial information about an actual proposal. The commercial sensitivities differed materially.

 

Disclosure of such information, held the Tribunal, would lead to the developer refusing to provide any further ‘open book’ information, which would stymie this particular development and dissuade developers from future ‘open book’ co-operation. The Tribunal was also impressed by the availability of alternative scrutiny mechanisms in this case. It was less impressed with the council’s argument that disclosure of the disputed information would damage its reputation with developers.

 

The Tribunal did order the disclosure of consultants’ reports and emails, with commercially sensitive information redacted. The developer’s financial model however, could not be redacted, and could be withheld. On this last point, a notable practical issue emerged: both the council and the Commissioner had interpreted the request as being for a static version of the developer’s financial model. A ‘live’ model – i.e. a spreadsheet containing visible formulae – is another matter. The Tribunal warned that in future cases, clarification should be sought from the requester.

Digital Agenda: EU Commission refers UK to ECJ over privacy and personal data protection

October 4th 2010 by James Goudie QC

The European Commission has decided (IP/10/1215) to refer the United Kingdom to the ECJ for not fully implementing EU rules on the confidentiality of electronic communications such as e-mail or internet browsing. Specifically, the Commission considers that UK law does not comply with EU rules on consent to interception and on enforcement by supervisory authorities. The EU rules in question are laid down in the ePrivacy Directive 2002/58/EC and the Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC. The infringement procedure was opened in April 2009 (IP/09/570), following complaints from UK internet users notably with regard to targeted advertising based on analysis of users’ internet traffic. These complaints were handled by the Information Commissioner’s Office, the UK personal data protection authority, and the police forces responsible for investigating cases of unlawful interception of communications. The Commission previously requested the UK authorities in October 2009 (IP/09/1626) to amend their rules to comply with EU law.

The Commission considers that existing UK law governing the confidentiality of electronic communications is in breach of the UK’s obligations both under the ePrivacy Directive and under the Data Protection Directive in three specific areas:

  •  there is no independent national authority to supervise the interception of some communications, although the establishment of such authority is required under the ePrivacy and Data Protection Directives, in particular to hear complaints regarding interception of communications
  • current UK law authorises interception of communications not only where the persons concerned have consented to interception but also when the person intercepting the communications has ‘reasonable grounds for believing’ that consent to do so has been given. These UK provisions do not comply with EU rules defining consent as “freely given, specific and informed indication of a person’s wishes”
  • current UK law prohibiting and providing sanctions in case of unlawful interception are limited to ‘intentional’ interception only, whereas EU law requires Member States to prohibit and to ensure sanctions against any unlawful interception regardless of whether committed intentionally or not.