We have posted a number of times on the contentious issue of late reliance, i.e. whether a public authority is entitled to rely as of right on an exemption or exception (under FOIA or the EIR) raised for the first time before the Tribunal. Last month, the Upper Tribunal answered this question with a firm “yes” in its decision on appeals by the Home Office and Defra, available here. That may not be the last word on this issue: Simon Birkett, founder of Clean Air London and Second Respondent to Defra’s appeal, has applied for permission to appeal that decision to the Court of Appeal. The press releases and grounds of appeal are available here.
Tag: EIR
CONFIDENTIAL COMMERCIAL INFORMATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS – NEW TRIBUNAL DECISION
A question which is frequently posed under both FOIA and the EIR is whether and to what extent confidential, commercial information can lawfully be withheld by a public authority. The recent decision of the First Tier Tribunal in the case of Staffordshire County Council v IC & Silbelco [2010] UKFTT 573 (GRC), (EA/2010/0015) embodies a number of important principles which should be considered whenever this question is being posed.
In Staffordshire, a request had been made for disclosure of particular commercial information consisting of the sales figures and reserve figures which a particular quarry operator (Sibelco) had generated in respect of the minerals which it quarried. The information had been provided by Sibelco to the local authority under a voluntary scheme. The scheme had been set up with a view to assisting the authority in discharging its statutory obligations as a mineral planning authority. Sibelco had provided the information to the authority on the express basis that it was to be treated in strictest confidence. Following a request for disclosure of the information, the authority refused to disclose the information on the basis that it was exempt under s. 41 FOIA (the confidential information exemption). During the complaints process before the Commissioner, the authority accepted that, in view of the environmental nature of the information, the applicable access regime was the EIR, rather than FOIA. However, it went on to argue that the information was still exempt under r. 12(5)(e) (commercial/confidential information exception) or 12(5)(f) (exception in respect of information provided in confidence) EIR. The Commissioner accepted that both exceptions were engaged in respect of the disputed information. However, he concluded that, on an application of the public interest test, the public interest weighed in favour of the information being disclosed. The authority appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the First Tier Tribunal. The Tribunal held that the Commissioner had erred as the public interest balance provided for under r. 12(1)(b) EIR weighed in favour of the information being withheld.
Importantly, in analysing the application of the public interest test the Tribunal took into account the recent Court of Appeal judgment in Veolia v Nottinghamshire CC [2010] EWCA 1214. In that case, which was concerned with the access to confidential, commercial information under s. 15 of the Audit Commission Act 1998, Rix LJ concluded that: (a) he could see no reason why ‘valuable commercial confidential information’ could not amount to a ‘possession’ for the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention of Human Rights (A1/P1) (b) in the circumstances, unrestricted disclosure of such information would amount to an interference with the A1/P1 right to possession enjoyed by the person whose information it was; and (c) such interference would have to be justified if it were not to be unlawful under the ECHR (see §§120-122). In Staffordshire, the Tribunal relied upon Rix LJ’s reasoning to arrive at the following conclusions on the application of the EIR (and FOIA) to confidential, commercial information (§151):
- ‘The disclosure of confidential information by a public body such as the Appellant engages the ECHR rights of the holder of the confidence;
- A statutory right for the public to have access to any information must have an exception read into it to exempt the disclosure of confidential information in order to give effect to those ECHR rights;
- The presumption in favour of disclosure of all environmental information held by public bodies in Regulation 12(2) EIR 2004 must now be read subject to an exception in the case of any such information which is held by the public body subject to a legal duty of confidentiality;
- Where environmental information is held by a public body which is subject to a legal duty of confidentiality there is recognised to be a “strong public interest” in the maintenance of valuable commercial confidential information;
- Arguments can be advanced on the individual circumstances of the case to seek to justify overriding the duty of confidence for particular pieces of information.’
The Tribunal was of the view that the facts of the case were such that there was no justification for overriding the duty of confidence owed to Sibelco in respect of the disputed information.
In light of the Tribunal’s analysis of the implications of Veolia, it is to be expected that human rights arguments will now commonly feature in any appeal involving an application of the EIR or FOIA to confidential, commercial information.
WATER UTILITY COMPANIES NOT ‘PUBLIC AUTHORITIES’ UNDER THE EIR
The Upper Tribunal has this week handed down an important decision on the question of whether privatised water utility companies are ‘public authorities’ for the purpose of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (EIR): Smartsource v IC & 19 Water Companies (case no. GI/2458/2010). The background to the appeal was that Smartsource had submitted near identical requests for disclosure of information to some 19 water utility companies. It was not in dispute that the requests fell to be addressed under the EIR. The companies refused to provide the requested information on the basis that they were not ‘public authorities’ for the purposes of r. 2(2) EIR and, hence, were not subject to the disclosure obligations provided for in r. 5 EIR. The Commissioner rejected Smartsource’s complaint about the refusal on the basis that he accepted that the companies were not public authorities under r. 2(2). Smartsource appealed the Commissioner’s decision to the tribunal. The importance of the issues at stake in the case resulted in the appeal being transferred to the Upper Tribunal. The central issues which the Upper Tribunal was called upon to determine were as follows: (1) did the companies ‘carry out functions of public administration’ such that they fell within limb 2(2)(c) of the r. 2 definition of public authority; (2) alternatively, were they ‘under the control’ of a relevant public authority such that they fell within limb 2(2)(d) of the r. 2 definition.
With respect to the first issue, the Tribunal held that the companies did not carry out functions of public administration. It reached this conclusion applying a multifactoral approach akin to the approach adopted in the earlier cases of Network Rail v IC (EA/2006/0061) and Port of London Authority v IC & Hibbert (EA/2006/0083). Notably, the Tribunal rejected arguments advanced by Smartsource that the companies fell within limb 2(2)(d) of the definition because they: were appointed as statutory undertakers; were subject to a range of conditions imposed under statute; were subject to a comprehensive regulatory regime; were unable to choose their own customers or set their own prices; were obliged to provide a universal service; and would be subject to State intervention in the event that they failed. With respect to the second issue, the Tribunal held that that the companies were not ‘under the control’ of a relevant public authority for the purposes of r. 2(2)(d). In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal accepted arguments advanced on behalf of the Commissioner and the companies that: the concept of ‘control’ in this context meant something more than that the body in question was merely subject to a stringent regime of statutory regulation; the aim of r. 2(2)(d) was to capture State/Executive functions in all their various guises and not the activities of privatised companies of the sort which were in issue in the instant case.
Importantly, the Tribunal also rejected ‘hybridity’ arguments to the effect that a body can be a public authority under the EIR for some purposes but not for others. According to the Tribunal, the way in which r. 2 was formulated meant that the body either was or was not a public authority (cf. the approach adopted in Port of London v IC).
COUNCIL ENTITLED TO WITHHOLD PROPERTY DEVELOPER’S FINANCIAL MODEL: BRISTOL CITY DISTINGUISHED
Bath & North East Somerset Council v IC (EA/2010/0045) is the latest application of the ‘commercial confidentiality’ exemption under regulation 12(5)(e) EIR to a request for information on agreements between a local authority and a property developer.
The council and the developer entered into discussions about building homes on 70 acres of brownfield land within a UNESCO World Heritage Site. Only a small proportion of this land was owned by the council, the rest being owned by the developer, who would also bear 100% of the risk of the project. The proposed £500m project would deliver 50% of the council’s new homes target for the next 10 years – the council was therefore acting as both beneficiary and planning authority.
With a potential section 106 agreement in mind, the council and developer reached a co-operation agreement, whereby the developer taking an ‘open book’ approach, i.e. making its financial models and reports available to the council. This was the information at issue before the Tribunal.
The Tribunal found that the public interest favoured maintaining the exemption. In so doing, it distinguished this case from Bristol City Council v ICO and Portland and Brunswick Squares Association (EA/2010/0012) – on which, see my post here and article in the Local Government Lawyer here – where disclosure of the information was ordered. Bristol City concerned a viability assessment designed to show that a hypothetical scheme was not viable; that assessment used generic, industry-level pricing. In contrast, this case concerned detailed and developer-specific financial information about an actual proposal. The commercial sensitivities differed materially.
Disclosure of such information, held the Tribunal, would lead to the developer refusing to provide any further ‘open book’ information, which would stymie this particular development and dissuade developers from future ‘open book’ co-operation. The Tribunal was also impressed by the availability of alternative scrutiny mechanisms in this case. It was less impressed with the council’s argument that disclosure of the disputed information would damage its reputation with developers.
The Tribunal did order the disclosure of consultants’ reports and emails, with commercially sensitive information redacted. The developer’s financial model however, could not be redacted, and could be withheld. On this last point, a notable practical issue emerged: both the council and the Commissioner had interpreted the request as being for a static version of the developer’s financial model. A ‘live’ model – i.e. a spreadsheet containing visible formulae – is another matter. The Tribunal warned that in future cases, clarification should be sought from the requester.
ACCESSING PROPERTY SEARCH INFORMATION – NEW HIGH COURT JUDGMENT
Last week I posted on a judicial review claim which was then being heard in the High Court on the question of access to property search information held by local authorities. Judgment was handed down in the case last Friday – OneSearch Direct v City of York Council [2010] EWHC 590 (Admin). The case involved an attempt by a property search company (OneSearch) to gain direct access to unrefined property records held by a local authority. The advantage to OneSearch of gaining such direct access is that it would not have to pay to receive the relevant property search information through what is commonly known as the ‘CON29R’ system. The CON29R system typically entails local authorities providing answers to property search enquiries (on a form known as the CON29R form) and then charging for the provision of that information under the Local Authorities (England) (Charges for Property Searches) Regulations 2008. When OneSearch’s request for direct access to the records was refused by the council, the company brought a claim for judicial review against the council. In that claim, which was treated as a test case, OneSearch argued that denying access to the unrefined records was unlawful having regard to the statutory purpose and intention underlying the relevant local authority legislative scheme. Hickenbottom J rejected OneSearch’s claim. He held that it was entirely lawful and in accordance with the statutory scheme for the council to opt to provide the relevant property search information through the CON29R system. This judgment will come as a blow to those property search companies who see the CON29R system as a costly system which unjustly allows local authorities to exploit their monopolistic position as controllers of property search records. Notably, the rights of access available under the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 were not relied upon by OneSearch in this case – cf my recent post on the case of East Riding Council v ICO & York Place. 11KBW’s Jason Coppel acted on behalf of the council.
ACCESS TO PROPERTY SEARCH INFORMATION – TEST CASE IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
This has been a particularly busy week so far as the law relating to accessing property search information is concerned. On 15 March, I blogged about a new Information Rights Tribunal judgment on the application of the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 (EIR) to requests for property search information – see my post. On 17-18 March 2010, the Administrative Court (Hickinbotham J) heard a test case judicial review of the policy of City of York Council on access to and charges for property search information under the Local Authorities (England) (Charges for Property Searches) Regulations 2008. The Claimant, Onesearch Direct Limited, maintains that all local authorities have an obligation under the 2008 Regulations to grant it direct access to their property records, and to charge no more than the cost of doing so. It is understood that Onesearch are pursuing their claim under the 2008 Regulations rather than the EIR in part because of the administrative inconvenience of having to wait up to 20 days to receive a response under the EIR (see r. 5(2) EIR). Judgment is expected on Friday 20 March 2010. Jason Coppel represents the Council.